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The NME Import Regulation Dilemma: Two
Proposals for a New Regulatory Approach
Christopher F. Corr*
As international trade has increased in volume and significance,
the United States has expanded its trade relationship with nonmarket
economy countries (NMEs).1 This increased trade has exacerbated
the unique and substantial difficulties the United States has encoun-
tered in applying import regulations to products from NMEs. The
purpose of this Article is to explain the alarming inadequacy in the
existing U.S. laws regulating imports from NMEs and to analyze cur-
rent proposals for a solution to this problem. The Article will discuss
the increasing imports from NMEs, the present U.S. laws regulating
such imports, the problems with these laws, and the potential alter-
natives to present laws.
I. The Nonmarket Economy Country
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), 2 as the agency
required to monitor trade between the United States and NMEs, de-
fines NMEs as countries whose imports can be investigated under
section 4063 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. 4 Section 406 ap-
plies to countries dominated or controlled by communism. 5
Section 410 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the
* Attorney, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C.; B.A.
1983, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1986, George Washington University, Na-
tional Law Center. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of N. David Palme-
ter and Jeffrey S. Neeley. The author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this
Article.
I See infra notes 2-4.
2 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) empowers the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC) to conduct investigations to determine fiscal and economic effects of U.S. customs
laws upon U.S. domestic industry and labor. The organization of the ITC and its general
powers is explained at id. §§ 1330-31.
3 Id. § 2436.
4 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-816, § 331, 88 Stat. 2049. For references to this
definition, see ITC 41ST 0. REP. TO CONGRESS AND THE TRADE POL'Y COMM. ON TRADE
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE NONMARKET ECON. COUNTRIES DURING 1984, 3 (1985) [herein-
after 41ST ITC REP.].
5 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(1) (1982); see also Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 72
(1982) (statement of the AFL-CIO discussing the definition of NMEs) [hereinafter Senate
NME Hearing].
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ITC to monitor trade between the United States and NMEs. 6 The
ITC has determined that the countries to be monitored 7 as NMEs
are those listed in headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the
United States. 8 Countries presently listed under headnote 3(d) are:
Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia,
parts of Indochina under communist domination, North Korea, the
Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Southern
Sakhalin, Tanna Tuva, and the U.S.S.R.9 In addition, the ITC treats
Hungary, the People's Republic of China, and Romania as NMEs.10
In trade regulation cases involving the Department of Com-
merce (Commerce),I NMEs are defined as countries in which "sales
or offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in that country...
do not permit a determination of foreign market value," under the
regular antidumping laws. 12 This determination is made on a case
by case basis, but in practice, the countries found by Commerce to
be NMEs are the same as those listed by the ITC.13
NMEs, principally the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, as they have worked to reform their
economies, have developed into important U.S. trading partners.' 4
From 1974 to 1981 total trade between the United States and its
principal NME trading partners tripled,15 and it increased from 1981
6 19 U.S.C. § 2441 (1982).
7 Id.
8 Id. § 1202(d).
9 Id. § 1202(3)(d).
10 ITC 47TH Q. REP. TO CONGRESS AND THE TRADE POL'Y COMM. ON TRADE BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND THE NONMARKET ECON. COUNTRIES DURING APRIL-JUNE 1986, 1 n.3 (1986)
(explaining why Yugoslavia is no longer considered an NME) (hereinafter 47TH ITC REP.]
The ITC has determined that the NMEs that trade with the United States at a level which
might possibly injure a domestic industry are: Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Ger-
many, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the U.S.S.R. Id.
I I As will be discussed infra at notes 44-61, in antidumping cases, the Department of
Commerce determines whether an NME is selling at less than fair value. Their term for
NME is a "state-controlled economy."
12 19 C.F.R. § 358.8(a) (1986). In Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union, 49
Fed. Reg. 23,428 (Dep't of Comm. 1984) (rescission of initiation), the Department of
Commerce defined an NME as a country that "operates on principles of nonmarket cost or
pricing structures so that sales or offers for sale of merchandise in that country or to other
countries do not reflect the market value of the merchandise." Id.
13 See Petroleum Wax Candles from the People's Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,085 (Dep't of Comm. 1986) (notice), for detailed discussions of the economic criteria
that Commerce applies in determining whether a country is an NME. These criteria
chiefly concern government controls, both indirect and direct, over the factors of produc-
tion of manufactured goods, and over the planning and production of agricultural prod-
ucts in the economy as a whole. Id. at 25,086. Commerce's broad application of these
factors in these subsequent cases appears to indicate that no sector of an NME, no matter
how market-oriented, will be defined as an NME. See also Natural Menthol from the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 46 Fed. Reg. 3259 (Dep't of Comm. 1981) (prelim.
determination).
14 Senate Finance Committee, Memorandum of the Senate Finance Comm. (May 4,
1984) (unpublished document) [hereinafter Senate Finance Memo].
15 Id.
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to 1985 by twenty-three percent.1 6 U.S. merchandise trade with
NMEs during this period has consistently run a significant surplus -
this is especially important in light of the present massive U.S. trade
deficit.' 7 In addition to economic trade benefits,' 8 the increased
economic interaction with NMEs is thought to provide political bene-
fits for the United States, particularly with the PRC and Eastern Eu-
ropean nations, "through greater economic interdependence ...."19
As NMEs have become more active in international trade, however,
the United States has encountered unique and substantial problems
in regulating the growing number of NME imports entering the
United States. The basic dilemma for the United States is, in es-
sence, how to enhance trade with NMEs and protect domestic indus-
try at the same time.
Effective import regulation is particularly important with respect
to NME goods because NME exporters may have a variety of motives
for selling their goods in the United States at "unfairly" low
prices. 20 First, the NME may have the common predatory purpose
of subduing competition in the importing country and recouping
losses by raising prices once the market is effectively dominated. 2 1
Second, the NME exporter may want to sell surplus or accidentally
produced goods in an untried or occasional market abroad at a low
16 Id. Moreover, three communist countries receive most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff
treatment: Hungary, China and Romania. 19 U.S.C. § 120 2 (g) (1986). MFN status allows
a country to receive the benefits of tariff rate concessions, set forth in column I of the tariff
schedule..Id.; see also 47TH ITC REP., supra note 10, at 2, in which the ITC provides the
history of MFN treatment given to NMEs, including Poland.
17 See 41ST ITC REP., supra note 4, at 9; ITC, 45TH Q. REP. TO CONGRESS AND THE
TRADE POL'Y COMM. ON TRADE BETWEEN THE U. S. AND THE NONMARKET ECON. COUNTRIES
DURING 1985 (1986) [hereinafter 45TH ITC REP.]. This surplus has been declining, how-
ever, from 3.57 billion in 1983 to 1.2 billion in 1985.
18 See 45TH ITC REP., supra note 17, at 5, which states that U.S. exports to the PRC
have increased while exports to the USSR have decreased (chiefly grain shipments), mak-
ing the PRC's share of U.S. exports to NMEs increase to 54.1% in 1985. See also Senate
NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Senator Robert Dole); 4 7 TH ITC REP., supra
note 10, at 5, stating that U.S. exports to Eastern European countries increased by 14.1%
in the first quarter of 1986; Trade Policy No. 227, Daily Executive Reporter (BNA) 2 (Nov.
25, 1986) (stating that East-West trade is predicted to increase in the next five years);
Journal of Commerce, Nov. 19, 1986, at 4A, col. 1 (stating that there are 40 planned U.S.-
Soviet joint ventures).
19 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 2. The PRC's rapidly expanding trade with
the United States has propelled it to a dominant trade position which may enhance polit-
ical relations. Speech by Paula Stern, Chairwoman, U.S. International Trade Commission,
to The Washington Foreign Law Society (Nov. 13, 1984), reprinted in 18 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 709 (1985) [hereinafter Stern Speech]; see also Options to Improve Trade
Remedy Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 915 (1983) (statement of Professor Lee Albert) [hereinafter House Trade
Hearings]; 129 CONG. REC. S7355 (daily ed. May 24, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heinz, noting
the increase in U.S. trade with China).
20 Feller, The Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 115,
120-21 (1967).
21 Id. at 120.
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price calculated to give him an immediate turnover. 22 Third, a new
NME exporter lacking predatory intent may simply wish to gain a
foothold in the market by underselling competitors. 23 NMEs have a
unique incentive in this third scenario because they may have to
overcome a purchaser's uncertainty as to continuing supply, lack of
spare parts, and the absence of a servicing or distribution organiza-
tion due to the stigma of communist country origin.24 Fourth, an
NME may sell at low prices to fulfill a state-planned export quota. 25
Finally, an NME may practice price discrimination solely to obtain
badly needed hard currency. 26
Despite the need for effective import regulation, current legisla-
tion is widely criticized as inadequate. 27 This criticism comes not
only from U.S. importers28 and NME exporters, 29 but domestic in-
dustries30 and administering agencies3' as well.
II. Existing Law
The present mechanisms for regulating imports from NMEs can
be divided into three categories: unfair trade law, injury based law
and antitrust law.
A. Unfair Trade Laws
The U.S. unfair trade laws protect U.S. industry from imported
goods sold in the United States at unfairly low prices. 32 These laws
are divided into the antidumping laws (AD), which protect against
22 Id.
23 Id. at 121.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 120.
26 Id.
27 See infra notes 28-31.
28 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 33 (statement by Allen L. Merkin, President,
Action Tunsgram, Inc. of East Brunswick calling existing legislation "absurd, unpredict-
able and expensive").
29 See Soltysinski, U.S. Antidumping Laws and State-Controlled Economies, 15 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 251, 255 (1981) (calling the existing legislation "time consuming and costly,"
and the present regulation of NME imports "arbitrary and political."; see also Interface
One: Conference Proceedings on the Applications of U.S. Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Laws to Imports from State-Controlled Economies and State-Owned Enter-
prises 106 (D. Wallace, F. Spina, & R. Rawson, eds. 1980) (available from The Institute
For International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinaf-
ter Interface One].
30 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 49 (statement of W. Ray Shockley, American
Textile Manufacturers Institute (A.T.M.I.) describing present NME import regulation law
as "no more predictable than a 'roll of the dice.' ").
31 Id. at 3 (Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, stat-
ing that existing law is "enormously burdensome and excessively complicated."); see also
Stern Speech, supra note 19, in which Chairwoman Stern states that U.S. NME regulation
law is in need of a "major overhaul."
32 See Interface Two: Conference Proceedings on the Legal Framework of East-West
Trade, (D. Wallace & D. Flores, eds. 1980) (available from The International Law Insti-
tute, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Interface Two]. Robert Hudec, Pro-
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the importation of goods sold in the United States for less than what
they are sold for in the exporting country33 and the countervailing
duty laws (CVD), which protect against the importation of subsidized
goods.3 4 Both AD and CVD laws are criticized as being ineffective,
overly complex, expensive, time consuming, unpredictable, and in-
equitable.35 Critics allege that both sets of laws negatively impact
domestic producers as well as U.S. importers and NME exporters. 36
During the revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions of 1979, the problem of applying the market based AD and
CVD laws to NMEs was left unresolved.37 U.S. unfair trade laws,
based on the GATT system, presuppose that "importation and ex-
portation are handled by private firms which, stimulated by profit
motives, are guided by commercial considerations.1 38 The govern-
ment controlled NME countries, however, do not operate on market
principles, and the actual cost of producing their goods is generally
impossible to determine; price references are not useful and the fac-
tors of production cannot be valued because currency is not convert-
ible and resource allocation is not governed by the market forces of
supply and demand.3 9
U.S. unfair trade laws are based on the free market economic
fessor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School provides a discussion of U.S.
unfair trade laws.
33 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-77 (1982).
34 Id. §§ 161-72.
35 Remedy For Artificial Pricing of Articles Produced by Nonmarket Economy Countries: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Finance Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-
28 (statement of Harry Kopp, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Trade and Commer-
cial Development) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on S. 958]; see also id. at 7-20 (statement of
Lionel Olmer). "In both cases [antidumping and countervailing duty laws], the normal
investigative process becomes immersed in debates over comparative and constructive val-
ues that quickly lead to proposed determinations based on hypothetical rather than real
transactions." Id.
36 Id. at 7-20 (statement of Lionel Olmer).
37 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 72 (statement of the AFL-CIO).
38 K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 317-18
(1970).
39 See Horlick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/Countervailing
Duty Laws, 18 INT'L L. 807, 818-19 (1984), stating:
The heavy intervention of the government in the setting of relative prices
means that the ultimate prices and costs in NMEs reflect political, economic, or bureau-
cratic factors rather than local supply and demand. World-market prices are not
decisive facts in a typical NME production function as the internal economy
enjoys sufficient isolation from the world economy to effectively insulate its
producers from these economic forces . . . . [Ilndeed, even if Commerce
could measure a "real" home-market price or cost in a nonmarket economy,
they would have to find a way around the inconvertibility of all NME curren-
cies (except perhaps the Hungarian forint).
Id. (emphasis added); see also Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg.
19,370 (Dep't of Comm. 1984). Commerce stated that in an NME, "resources are not
allocated by a market. With varying degrees of control, allocation is achieved by central
planning." Id. at 19,371.
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principles of comparative advantage and free trade,40 and in order to
determine whether an import price is "unfair," these laws require
costs and values that are unavailable from NMEs. 4 1 Because U.S. un-
fair trade laws require information not available from NMEs, their
application to imports from these centrally-controlled countries cre-
ates a major problem.42 Hence, there is almost universal agreement
that price-based U.S. unfair trade laws do not adequately contem-
plate the economic systems of NMEs 43 and are in need of revision. 44
1. Antidumping Duty Law
Commerce imposes AD duties45 when imports are sold in the
United States for less than fair value, 46 and threaten or cause mate-
rial injury.4 7 Sales at less than fair value occur when, taking into ac-
40 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 19 (statement of Gary Horlick).
41 Recent Developments, 5J. OF CORP. Bus. & COMP. MARKET L. 395, 397 (1983).
42 Senator Heinz stated:
The concept of dumping-sales at less than fair value- is inherently a free-
market concept. It is useful only to the extent that costs and prices in an
economy are real, so that a fair value can be determined. With rare excep-
tions, these conditions do not exist in a nonmarket economy and our law has
become seriously contorted in an effort to deal logically with this fundamen-
tal inconsistency.
129 CONG. REC. S7356 (daily ed. May 24, 1983) (statement of Senator Heinz); see Barcelo,
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 850
(1977). "One cannot speak of market imperfections and nondistortive actions or even the
distinction between exports and domestic subsidies if an economy as a whole is not gov-
erned by the market principle." Id.
43 Senate Hearing on S. 958, supra note 35, at 245 (letter ofJuliana Pilon, policy analyst
of the Heritage Foundation, to the Senate Finance Comm.); see also Senate NME Hearing,
supra note 5, at 19 (Gary Horlick commenting on the "meaninglessness" of pursuing real
costs and prices of nonmarket economies).
44 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 830, stating that the debate over change in
NME trade legislation is a question of "in what way?" not "whether?"; Senate NME Hear-
ing, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Lionel Olmer); see also id. at 74. In a letter to Senator
Danforth, Richard Breault, group vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, stated that
"there is clearly a need to reform U.S. laws governing the treatment of imports from
nonmarket economies." Id.
45 Zarin, Countertrade and the Law, 18 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 235, 247 (1984).
Zarin states:
An antidumping investigation is initiated when the Commerce Department
believes one is warranted or when an "interested party" files a petition on
behalf of an industry that claims to have been materially injured or whose
establishment in the United States has been materially retarded as a result of
sales of foreign merchandise in the United States at less than fair value.
Id.
46 See infra notes 48-49.
47 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). Zarin states:
After determining the foreign market value, the Commerce Department will
determine the appropriate measure of the U.S. price, the other variable nec-
essary to ascertain whether dumping has occurred. The U.S. price is mea-
sured by either the purchase price or the exporter's sales price, as
appropriate. The purchase price is the price at which the goods are
purchased or agreed to be purchased from the manufacturer or producer of
the merchandise prior to importation. When the merchandise is purchased
from the producer or manufacturer prior to importation by a person unre-
lated to the seller for export to the United States the purchase price is the
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count certain adjustments, the same or similar merchandise is sold at
a higher price in a foreign market than it is in the United States.48
Commerce determines whether dumping has occurred by comparing
the U.S. price of the merchandise with the foreign market value.49
With regard to imports from market economies, the foreign market
value of products is calculated according to a methodological hierar-
chy. 50 Commerce looks first to the home market price, which is the
adjusted price the foreign manufacturer charges to customers in the
country of export. 51 Second, Commerce looks to the price of ex-
ports to customers in other countries. Finally, Commerce will con-
struct the value of such goods based on adjusted material costs plus
general expenses and profits. 52
The Treasury Department, as the predecessor to Commerce,
recognized the inadequacy of these three methods for determining
the foreign market value of imports from NMEs because the neces-
sary costs and prices are unavailable. Thus, the Treasury Depart-
ment initiated a fourth method of calculation of less than fair value
specifically for NME imports, that calculates a theoretical cost of pro-
duction in any "surrogate" market economy judged to be economi-
cally comparable to the NME in question.5 3 This methodology for
NMEs was codified by Congress 54 based on the rationale that surro-
gate countries' costs should be used because supply and demand
forces do not operate to produce reliable prices for comparison,
either in the home market or in third countries. It was carried for-
ward into Commerce regulations, and is currently in practice. 55
Under this NME statutory provision and its regulations, Com-
merce ignores prices and costs in an NME and instead bases an NME
import's fair market value on the price or cost figures of a "surro-
gate" market economy producer of a similar good. 56 This statutory
and regulatory scheme sets forth a hierarchy of alternate methodolo-
appropriate measure of the U.S. price. When the parties are related, and the
goods are not sold to an unrelated purchaser until after importation, the ex-
porter's sales price is the price of the merchandise when it is sold in the
United States by or for the account of the exporter.
Zarin, supra note 45, at 250.
48 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 167 7 a (1982).
49 Zarin, supra note 45, at 248.
50 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982).
51 Id. § 1677b(a)(l)(B).
52 Id. § 1677b(a)(2)(e). "Under the constructed value analysis, the Commerce De-
partment focuses on whether the cost of manufacturing plus profit exceeds the U.S.
price." Zarin, supra note 45, at 249.
53 See Amendment of Antidumping Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262-63 (1978). In 1978
treasury regulations regarding NMEs were amended to require that surrogate countries be
economically comparable. See also 43 Fed. Reg. 272 (1978).
54 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
55 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1986).
56 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
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gies for determining the value of an NME import. 57 The first statu-
tory preference of Commerce is to use the home market or export
price of similar goods sold in a comparable market economy country
(surrogate) to calculate value; 58 if Commerce is unable to make such
a calculation because it cannot find a surrogate that produces a simi-
lar product, the NME provides that its second preference is to con-
struct the value of such goods in a comparable market economy; that
is, Commerce makes the cost valuation of a product based on wages,
prices and costs in the surrogate country, despite the fact that the
surrogate country does not produce the product in question. 59 If
Commerce is unable to find a comparable surrogate that produces a
similar product, then the regulations provide a fall-back provision in
which Commerce uses the import prices of market economies which
produce similar goods. 60
These regulations, which set forth the methodology for applying
AD law to NMEs, are fundamentally flawed and have been widely
criticized for a variety of reasons.61
a. Surrogate Price Methodology
Commerce's first preference, the surrogate economy concept,
has a number of problems. First, the regulations have the effect of
imposing shorter procedural time constraints on an NME proceed-
ing because within the same time period for a "normal" antidumping
proceeding, a number of complex preliminary determinations must
be made. Commerce must first determine if the exporting country is
an NME. 62 If it finds in the affirmative, Commerce must identify a
surrogate country and then secure the cooperation of both the gov-
ernment and a producer or producers of similar products within this
country.63
Second, finding a similar product in a market economy is often
problematic and can lead to an arbitrary result. Variations in the
57 Id. § 1677b(c)(i)(2); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1986).
58 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(b)(1) (1986).
59 Id. § 353.8(b)(2); see also Senate Finance Memo, supra note 14, at 3 (Lionel Olmer,
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, discussed the application of the
Commerce regulations to nonmarket economies); House Trade Hearings, supra note 19, at
912 (statement of Professor Paul Marer discussing the effectiveness of constructed value
and surrogate country methods of valuation).
60 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(a), (b)(3) (1986). Generally, as a last resort, Commerce will in-
terpret the regulations to permit the use of the average import price of a "basket" of
importing countries. See, e.g., Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From the People's Repub-
lic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,469 (Dep't of Comm. 1986) (preliminary determination);
Iron Construction Castings From the People's Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 17,222
(Dep't of Comm. 1986) (determination); Shop Towels from the People's Republic of
China, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,764 (Dep't of Comm. 1983) (preliminary determination).
61 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
62 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
63 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 820.
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quality and composition of products result in value disparities that
make a price comparison of two "similar" products inappropriate.
To base the "fair" price of a low-quality NME product on the price
of a similar, but higher quality market economy product is unfair,
and can have a substantial impact on the dumping determination. 64
Third, finding an economically comparable surrogate country
that produces a similar product is difficult, time consuming, and
often leads to an arbitrary and unpredictable result. 65 Assuming a
market economy country producing a similar product is identified,
Commerce must secure the government's permission before ap-
proaching the country's producers. 66 Even if permission is granted,
a surrogate country's producers often do not cooperate because
there is no incentive to provide the information Commerce requires
to draw accurate comparisons. 67 In fact, there is often a disincentive
because cooperating with Commerce as a surrogate involves al-
lowing Commerce investigators access to confidential information
which becomes part of the record and can expose the surrogate
country to an AD action. 68 Consequently, it has become increasingly
unlikely for Commerce to find a surrogate country willing to cooper-
ate in the investigation.
If a surrogate does cooperate, the "fair" price and resulting
dumping margins are arbitrary and unpredictable because no one
knows what surrogate will be chosen; 69 exporters cannot set their
64 See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties
encountered in determining comparable goods.
65 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
66 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 821; see also Carbon Steel Plate from
Romania, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,292 (Dep't of Comm. 1984) (final admin. review).
67 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 4 (statement of Lionel Olmer); see, e.g.,
Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 821; Carbon Steel, 49 Fed. Reg. at 12,292; Unrefined
Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,870, 36,871 (Dep't
of Comm. 1983) (final determination) (West German producer refused to provide needed
data); see also Cuneo & Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: the State-Controlled Economy Issue in An-
tidumping Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277, 302 n.134 (1981-82). The authors note
that "[q]uite apart from the normal desire to keep business information confidential, com-
petitive considerations may play a role in determining the willingness to cooperate." Id.
68 Cuneo & Manuel, supra note 67. In Carbon Steel, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,293, Finland
agreed to serve as a surrogate for the antidumping investigation, providing detailed infor-
mation and allowing verification examinations. Soon afterward, on February 10, 1984,
U.S. Steel filed an antidumping complaint against Finnish steel plate using information
provided by Finland for Commerce.
69 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 817; see also Senate NME Hearing, supra
note 5, at 4 (statement of Lionel Olmer). Indeed, the unpredictability and unfairness of
the surrogate methodology is manifested in a recent case, ICC Industries Inc. v. United
States, No. 86-1201, slip op. (Fed. Cir. 1987), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit held that an importer of Chinese potassium permanganate "should have
known" that such imports were priced at less than fair value when compared to the surro-
gate Spain. The court held that the importer was liable for retroactive deposits under 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(4)(A) (1982), despite the fact that it was impossible for the importer to
know which country would be chosen as a surrogate and thus what a "fair" price would be.
The court was unmoved by this "seemingly unfair" fact. Id.
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prices at a "fair" level when they do not know which country's export
prices will represent fair value, and the domestic industry cannot
know if it will be granted relief.
"Fair value" determinations and the resulting dumping margins
are often arbitrary because they will fluctuate depending on the
country that is chosen as a surrogate. Moreover, dumping margins
can be arbitrary because of differences between a particular indus-
trial sector in the NME and in the country chosen as the surrogate. 70
NMEs have several complaints concerning the alleged discrimi-
natory nature of the surrogate approach of U.S. AD law. 7 1 First, U.S.
AD law does not allow for consideration of the lower costs of labor,
energy and raw materials in the NME. 72 Second, the NME exporter
does not possess a firm basis for calculating fair value prior to the
date of exportation of the merchandise. 73 Third, NMEs encounter
significant problems in challenging price and cost information sub-
mitted by their foreign competitors to Commerce.74 Fourth, the
NME exporter is often at the mercy of its competitors who serve as
surrogates. These surrogates have vested interests in the final out-
come of the procedure establishing fair value, and are protected by
confidentiality. 75
b. Constructed Value Methodology
As stated above, if Commerce cannot satisfy its first preference
because the home market or export price of a surrogate that pro-
duces a similar product cannot be determined, the statutory NME
methodology next requires Commerce to make a complex con-
structed valuation of NME goods. 76 This method involves calculat-
ing the sum of the estimated costs of production and other expenses,
including profit and packaging costs of the NME import 77 in a com-
parable market economy country. 78 This constructed value method-
70 Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 817. The dumping margin will also fluctuate
depending on which country is chosen as surrogate. Zarin, supra note 45.
71 See infra notes 79-83.
72 See Interface One, supra note 29, at 99 (statement of Prof. Franklin D. Holtzman).
73 Id.
74 Id. For instance, in steel investigations, NMEs are not permitted access under pro-
tective order to SSSI (Special Summary Steel Invoice) information regarding the specific
breakdown of steel types from surrogate countries that Commerce considers in determin-
ing fair value; thus, they do not have adequate information from which to challenge such
findings at the agency level.
75 Id. Nonmarket economies also find antidumping procedures arbitrary and political
because of their orientation. They assume the executive in the United States has the dis-
cretion to intervene and protect their goods when necessary, as is often the case in Euro-
pean Economic Community countries. Furthermore, antidumping law is viewed as
arbitrary because it is a difficult concept to interpret. Id. at 107 (statement of Professor
Paul Marer).
76 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
78 Id. § 1677b(c)(2) (1982).
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ology is plagued by similar difficulties in finding comparable market
country producers from which to obtain price or cost information,
and yields the same unpredictable results. It often leads to more un-
predictable, unrealistic and arbitrary results than the surrogate price
valuation methodology because the final cost calculation is the result
of a complicated, hypothetical compilation of various production and
finishing costs of an industry in a surrogate country that may not
even produce the goods in question. 79
The fact that two countries are comparable at a macroeconomic
level does not mean that their costs and prices in a particular indus-
try are the same. Thus, to superimpose the production function of
an NME upon the production costs and prices of a macroeconomi-
cally comparable country cannot yield an accurate determination of
"fair price," and yet this is the approach taken by the constructed
value methodology. 80 Often, the surrogate country's industry is not
comparable to the NME industry, and consequently, the resulting
value construction is inaccurate.8 1 Finally, because of the many pos-
sible surrogate countries that can be chosen, Commerce has broad
discretion in its selection, and a "politicized" administrator may
abuse such discretion.82
Regardless of whether a surrogate sales price or a constructed
value is used to determine fair value, the "comparable economy"
concept is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons. The regu-
lations state that the determination of comparability is essentially
based on macroeconomic data.83 This concept assumes that accu-
rate values can be obtained from an NME on a macroeconomic level,
79 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 73 (statement of R. Breault: "The current
approach of using a surrogate country to construct a fair market value ...has created
tremendous confusion on the part of domestic industry and foreign exporters alike); see,
e.g., Unrefined Montan Wax, 48 Fed. Reg. at 36,870, in which there were few countries pro-
ducing montan wax, and none of those few producer countries were at a comparable eco-
nomic level. The determination of a "comparable economy" is often arbitrary because
such determination, made on the basis of aggregate data is unreliable and ignores differ-
ing levels of development and sophistication in specific sectors of the economy. Id. at 4.
80 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 825.
81 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 16 (statement of Richard Cunningham). The
constructed value regulation bases prices on the costs of production in a market economy
"determined to be reasonably comparable in economic development" to a nonmarket
economy if specific "objective components or factors of production" of the nonmarket
economy are used in the valuation. The inherent flaw in the regulation is that the "compo-
nents or factors of production" of the nonmarket economy will be distorted by govern-
ment intervention and hence will not be comparable to the surrogate. Id.; see, e.g., Electric
Golf Carts From Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975) (final determination). There the
costs of a very sophisticated Polish golf cart industry were to be determined using the
costs, prices, and wages of Spain, a "comparable economy" with a very unsophisticated
golf cart industry.
82 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 825-26.
83 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(b)(1) (1986); see also Steel Wire Nails from the People's Republic
of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,247, 10,248 (1986) (final determination) in which Commerce
stated that it placed greater reliance on "general macro-economic criteria."
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despite the conceded fact that accurate microeconomic price and
cost data is impossible to obtain. Such an argument is unsound.8 4
Another problem with the "comparable economy" concept is
that, within comparable economies, sectors can be widely divergent
in levels of development, especially in an NME where the govern-
ment targets certain industries for development.8 5 The*NME's ex-
porting industry is often larger and more sophisticated than that
which normally exists in a country that is at a comparable level of
overall economic development (i.e., a very sophisticated NME steel in-
dustry may exist in an otherwise unsophisticated economy).8 6 The
standard thus provides an economically distorted price comparison
because it can result in the selection of a surrogate country whose
industry is less sophisticated than that of the NME.8 7 This, in turn,
may create an unrealistically favorable price comparison for the NME
exporter, or vice versa.88 This may likely occur with goods exported
from the PRC's special economic zones - sectors which contain an
increasing number of sophisticated industries.8 9
c. Import Price Fall-Back Methodology
The use of U.S. import prices as a fall-back method of determin-
ing fair value is also plagued with problems. 90 This method, which
usually derives an average import price from a basket of foreign ex-
84 There is no dispute that micro-economic data is not reliable in NMEs. It is unclear
whether the micro-economic data upon which Commerce relies is any more reliable.
85 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 820; Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 16
(statement of R. Cunningham).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 18; see, e.g., Trailer Axle From Hungary, 47 Fed. Reg. 66 (1982) (final deter-
mination), stating:
The obvious surrogate [Trailer Axle] was Canada where the producers manu-
factured trailer axles that were comparable in size and specifications to those
the Hungarian manufacturer produced for the U.S. market. Moreover, the
axles made and sold to Canada were exactly like those sold in the United
States by U.S. industry. Despite these considerations, Commerce instead se-
lected a small Italian manufacturer as the surrogate which led to numerous
difficulties.
Id.; see also Speech by Charles VerrillJr. given to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Round-
table Conference on Nonmarket Economy Import Regulations, (July 12, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter Verrill Speech]; Interface One, supra note 29, at 168 (Charles Verrill provides three
problem areas with comparable economy motion: 1) no adequate basis of comparison; 2)
illogical underlying assumptions; 3) reliance on NME industry costs); but see Interface
Two, supra note 32, at 173 (Prof. Soltysinski of Poland supporting the comparable econ-
omy notion as almost "universally accepted").
88 See Verrill Speech, supra note 87. However, it should be noted that such a compari-
son may have the exact opposite effect-an unrealistically favorable price comparison for
the domestic industry. This would likely occur when a sophisticated NME exporter is com-
pared to a backward, high-cost surrogate market industry.
89 See generally Klitgaard & Rasmussen, Preferential Treatment of Foreign Investment in the
People's Republic of China: Special Economic Zones and Industrial Development Districts, 7 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 377 (1984); Comment, Evaluating China's Special Economic
Zones, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 376 (1984).
90 See, e.g., Porcelain-on-Steel, 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,419; Iron Construction Castings, 51 Fed.
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porting countries, cannot provide a realistic cost valuation because it
generally does not consider whether the market countries in the bas-
ket, as well as the particular industrial sectors, are in any way eco-
nomically comparable with the NME under investigation, and does
not make circumstance of sale adjustments as to such prices. 91 This
basket method is also unpredictable because neither the exporter
nor the domestic industry can know in advance which countries will
actually make up the basket, what actual prices and volumes of sales
will be during the time period under investigation, and, conse-
quently, what the actual "fair" price will be after the average price is
calculated. 92
The average price calculation will be arbitrary as well, because
the product category for which prices are selected may be overbroad,
and may include products with substantial qualitative differences. 93
Domestic manufacturers argue that the use of import prices is inap-
propriate because they may be artificially low, due to the fact that
they reflect the unfair NME import prices.94 In contrast, NMEs com-
plain that the use of import prices allows their competitors to in-
crease their prices in order to raise the average price upon which fair
value is based and thus, precipitate a determination that NME im-
ports are being dumped.95
In a 1981 report, the General Accounting Office (GAO) summa-
rized the problems with the application of AD duties to NMEs by
stating that the combined effect of difficulties in the surrogate selec-
tion process, data verification, and the need for subjective adjust-
ments makes the current methods of applying AD law highly
unpredictable, of limited economic validity, and costly.
96
An illustration of the arbitrary and unworkable nature of the
present NME statutory provision may be illustrated by a brief review
of events in Barium Chloride from China.97 In the original investiga-
Reg. at 9483; Natural Bristle Paint Brushes and Brush Heads from the People's Republic
of China, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,812 (Dep't of Comm. 1985) (final determination).
91 Id.
92 The countries which make up the basket may not be subject to an unfair trade
investigation themselves. Such countries may vary the volume and files of their sales of
the imported product due to market considerations. See Legal Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at 18,
col. 1.
93 See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
94 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 818.
95 Id.
96 COMPTROLLER GEN. REP. TO THE CONGRESS OF THE U. S. ON U.S. L. & REG. APPLI-
CABLE TO IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET EcON. COULD BE IMPROVED 24 (1981) [hereinafter
COMPTROLLER GEN. 1981 REP.]. Some commentators, however, support existing legisla-
tion with certain modifications. House Trade Hearings, supra note 19, at 913, 1069. Both
Professor Marer and Peter Ehrenhaft find present regulations workable, although both call
for the substitution of constructed value for the surrogate country concept as the pre-
ferred method of valuing NME products. Id.
97 49 Fed. Reg. 33,916 (Dep't of Comm. 1984) (preliminary determination); see also
id. at 40,635.
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tion,9a Commerce identified India as the surrogate because it was
economically comparable to the PRC and was a producer of a prod-
uct similar to the NME import. When India did not cooperate with
Commerce, Commerce attempted, but failed, to find another market
country, comparable or not, that produced a similar product. Under
increasing time constraints, Commerce then decided that Thailand,
which did not produce barium chloride, was "reasonably compara-
ble" for purposes of constructing the value of this chemical. 99 After
a complex valuation of Thai costs of production, based on the PRC's
production function, Commerce found that the barium chloride was
being dumped at margins of 14.5 percent. 10 0 Several components of
this calculation were appealed to the Court of International Trade.
The court held, in part, that Commerce erred when it did not value
one of the components of barium chloride which the PRC received at
no charge, and that Commerce was correct in valuing the energy
component of production based on the cost of coal in Thailand, de-
spite the fact that the PRC used natural gas (unavailable in Thailand)
for half of its production.10
One week after this decision, Commerce published its determi-
nation in the annual review of the Barium Chloride case. 10 2 During
this review, Commerce determined that India and Peru were compa-
rable countries that produced the chemical, but neither country co-
operated. Consequently, in its preliminary determination,
Commerce based the "fair" price of barium chloride from the PRC
on the average import price of barium chloride from four highly de-
veloped Economic Community (EC) industries, and the dumping
margin jumped from 14.5 to 48.08 percent.10 3 This dramatic, un-
predictable, and potentially exclusionary increase in the dumping
margin was a result of the different method of calculation, not of any
actions by the Chinese producers. Later, in the final determination
of its annual review,' 0 4 Commerce switched back to a constructed
value methodology based on Thai costs, and determined that the
Chinese dumping margin was 7.82 percent, half of the original mar-
gin. Commerce noted, however, that it was entirely within its statu-
tory discretion to use a different fair value methodology in the
administrative review than it used in the original investigation. This
discretion is particularly startling in light of this case where, depend-
ing on which methodology is chosen, the margin of "fair" value can
vary from seven percent to forty-eight percent.
98 Id. at 33,916.
99 Id. at 13,730.
100 Id. at 23,341.
101 Chemical Prod. Corp. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 289 (C.I.T. 1986).
102 51 Fed. Reg. 41,141 (Dep't of Comm. 1986) (preliminary admin. review).
103 Id.
104 52 Fed. Reg. 313 (Dep't of Comm. 1987) (final admin. review).
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2. Countervailing Duty Law
The Tariff Act of 1930,105 as amended by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979,106 provided for the imposition of duties, as determined
by Commerce,' 0 7 to offset by an equivalent amount foreign subsi-
dies' 0 8 on goods imported into the United States. There are two
CVD laws.' 0 9 The first, Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930,1 1o applies
to countries "under the agreement,"'1 1 meaning those countries
that are signatories to the GATT Subsidies Code or have taken an
equivalent obligation. 1 12 Before imposing a CVD order, the ITC
must find that a U.S. industry is materially injured. 1 3
The second CVD law, section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930114
applies to countries, including most NMEs, not subscribing to the
GATT Subsidies Code." 5 In contrast to Title VII, imports from
countries under section 303 are not entitled to an ITC finding of
injury before a duty is imposed unless such goods are imported duty
free from a GATT member, 116 or an international obligation re-
quires such an injury finding."17
Under both Title VII and section 303, prior to the imposition of
a duty, Commerce must determine that a foreign person or coun-
try' 18 has subsidized the imports.' 19 This determination is extremely
difficult when an NME import is involved' 20 because the concept of
the CVD subsidies law is economically rooted in the belief that pri-
vate entities stimulated by profit motives should exist because they
are efficient, not because they are subsidized. Since NME govern-
ments control the means of production, private entities as envisioned
by CVD subsidies law do not exist in NMEs and hence, CVD law is
inapposite to NMEs. 12 1
105 Tariff Act of 1930, c. 497, Title III § 303, 46 Stat. 687.
106 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I § 103, 93 Stat. 190, 193.
107 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1986). "[W]henever any country shall pay or bestow, directly or
indirectly any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article
or merchandise ...." Id.
108 Zarin, supra note 45, at 257.
109 Id.
110 19 U.S.C. §§ 16 7 1-7 7g (1982 & Supp. 1986).
III Id. § 1671(b).
112 Id. § 1671(b)(1), (2).
113 Id. § 1671(a)(2).
114 Id. § 1303 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
15 Id. § 1303(a)(1) (1986).
116 Id. § 1303(a)(2). The allowance of an injury test from GAIT members does not
require signing of the subsidies code. Zarin, supra note 45, at 248 n.161.
117 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
118 Id. §§ 1671(a)(1)(B), 1677(b), 1303(a).
119 Id. §§ 1671(a)(1), 1303(a)(6).
120 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Lionel Olmer).
121 Id. at 30 (statement of the American Association of Exporters & Importers
(AAEI)). "Countervailing law designed to redress governmental interventions in
nonmarket economies are so pervasive as to make it impossible to identify any single gov-
ernmental intervention as a distortion or differential treatment actionable under the coun-
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In its report to Congress in 1981, the GAO acknowledged the
extensive difficulties of applying the CVD laws to NMEs.' 22 In addi-
tion to discussing the problem of access to information concerning
subsidy amounts,123 the GAO described the equally difficult problem
of ascertaining suitable exchange rates for converting subsidy
amounts stated in foreign currencies into U.S. dollars.' 24 The GAO
concluded that "[t]he practical effect of these problems is that actu-
ally identifying and quantifying subsidies remains only remotely
possible."' 25
On May 1, 1984, Commerce determined that CVD laws cannot
be applied to imports from NMEs. t26 In Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Czechoslovakia 127 and Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland,128 Commerce
concluded that a CVD action cannot be brought against NMEs. Com-
merce reasoned that subsidies cannot be identified in NMEs because
their centrally directed economic activity and use of administered
prices, plans, and targets, were irreconcilable with market stan-
dards.' 29 Domestic industries have opposed these Commerce deter-
minations as a significant detriment to U.S. producers because such
findings eliminate one of the present legal mechanisms for obtaining
relief from damaging imports.' 30
The Commerce determinations in these cases were reversed by
the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) in Continental Steel Corp.
v. United States,' 31 but were later affirmed by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit which reversed the CIT ruling in Ge-
orgetown Steel v. United States.' 32 In that case, the court held that CVD
law does not apply to NMEs based on the intent and purpose of the
CVD law as evidenced by its legislative history.' 33 The court stated
that no "unfair" countervailable subsidies existed in NMEs because
tervailing duty law." Id. Subsidies are disfavored by free trade advocates because they
encourage inefficiency by distorting economic behavior which would otherwise be con-
trolled by market forces of supply and demand. Id. at 5.
122 COMPTROLLER GEN. 1981 REP., supra note 96, at 27. "Perhaps the most perplexing
aspect of import trade administration vis-a-vis the nonmarket economy countries involves
questions of subsidies and countervailing duties." Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 32.
126 See infra notes 127-128.
127 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (Dep't of Comm. 1984) (final determination).
128 Id. at 19,374.
129 Id. at 19,371. "In NMEs, resources are not allocated by a market. With varying
degrees of control, allocation is achieved by central planning. Without a market, it is obvi-
ously meaningless to look for a misallocation of resources caused by subsidies. There is
no market process to distort or subvert." Id. at 19,372.
130 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 50 (statement of W. Ray Shockley, American
Textile Manufacturers Institute).
131 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (C.I.T. 1985).
132 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85- 2805, slip op. 21 (Fed. Cir. Sept.
18, 1986).
133 Id. at 13.
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any export incentives would not help an NME make a sale in the
United States, and that to the extent a subsidy can be identified, the
NME would only be subsidizing itself.'3 4
The court held that Congress, through its specific amendment
of the AD statute,'3 5 intended AD law to apply to NMEs.' 36 To the
extent the AD law is inadequate, the court stated that the appropriate
remedy was corrective legislation, not the application of the CVD
law.13 7
As discussed previously, the AD law is clearly inadequate, and
yet, as a result of the decision in Georgetown Steel, AD law is the only
unfair trade law that presently applies to NME imports. While the
court's decision that CVD law should not be applied to NME imports
is the only economically rational conclusion that could be reached,
the fact remains that the confused and unworkable NME import con-
trol system will contain one less remedy with which to protect U.S.
industry. It is apparent that the court left it to Congress to improve
the present NME import regulation system.' 38
In Georgetown Steel, the court also mentioned that there was an-
other law especially fashioned for application to NME imports: the
injury based section 406.
B. Discretionary, Injuy-Based Law - Section 406
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974,13 9 termed the "market
disruption" statute, is the corollary of section 201 (the escape clause)
of the Trade Act of 1974,140 and has special application to imports
from communist countries,' 4 1 regardless of whether such countries
have been granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. 142 This law
was especially composed for application to NMEs as a recognition by
Congress that existing laws inadequately regulated NME imports.' 43
Under section 201, the ITC investigates whether an article is be-
134 Id. at 17-18. This was held not to be the kind of "unfair" subsidy that the CVD law
was intended to prevent.
'35 19 U.S.C. § 167 7(c) (1982); see supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
136 Georgetown Steel, No. 85-2805, slip op. 21.
'37 Id. at 22-23.
138 See Legal Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at 18, col. 4. It should be noted that the House
Ways and Means Committee added a provision to its trade bill (H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1987), which states that Commerce may apply CVD law to NMEs when it can "iden-
tify and quantify" subsidies in an NME. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that this provi-
sion would cause Commerce to apply CVD law, because Commerce holds to the view that
subsidies cannot be identified in NMEs. A determination by Commerce that subsidies can-
not be identified or quantified, however, would be reviewable by the CIT under this provi-
sion. See 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 397 (Mar. 25, 1987).
'39 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
140 Id. § 2251.
141 Id. § 2436(e)(2).
142 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 341 (statement of Charles Verrill).
'43 Legal Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at 18, col. 1.
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ing imported into the United States "in such increased quantities as
to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof," to the
domestic industry producing an article directly competitive with the
imported article. ' 44
Because the purpose of section 201 is to provide an injured in-
dustry with a protected period in which to adjust,145 it applies to
fairly as well as unfairly traded goods so long as they cause sufficient
injury to a U.S. industry (e.g., there need not be sales at less than fair
value or a subsidy).' 46 If the ITC makes an affirmative injury deter-
mination, the President of the United States has the broad authority
to grant a variety of relief measures 47 or to deny relief if he finds
such relief contrary to U.S. economic interests.1 48 No relief is
granted after an affirmative ITC determination unless action is taken
by the President.' 49
Market disruption under section 406 is very similar to section
201 in that it too is injury-based. Market disruption occurs when the
volume of like articles imported from a communist country is in-
creasing so as to be a significant cause of material injury to a U.S.
industry.1 50 Although section 406 is procedurally similar to section
201,151 it differs substantially in certain respects.152 First, material
injury under section 406 is a lesser standard than the "serious in-
jury" requirement of 201 (e.g., under section 406, domestic industry
need not show as severe an injury as a prerequisite for relief).' 5 3
Second, market disruption must only be a significant cause of injury,
a lesser standard than the section 201 substantial cause require-
ment.' 54 These section 406 standards are lower because of congres-
sional concern about the possibility of rapid market flooding by
NMEs.' 55 However, under section 406, domestic industry must
144 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
145 Id. § 2251(a). This period is for a maximum of eight years.
146 Zarin, supra note 45, at 267.
147 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982).
148 Id. § 2253(a). The President may impose or increase a tariff, proclaim a tariff rate
quota or quantitative restriction, regulate an order making agreement, or combine any of
the above. Id.
149 This reflects U.S. trade policy. It shows a reluctance to allow relief when the trade
is not unfair.
150 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(l)(A) (1982).
151 See Zarin, supra note 45, at 272.
152 Id.
153 Id. However, the § 406 injury standard is greater than the AD or CVD standard.
This reflects the fact that under section 406, the NME imports are not "unfair."
154 Id. at 273.
155 Calabrese, Market Disruption Caused By Imports from Communist Countries: Analysis of
section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 119 (1981). This lesser standard
was chosen because of congressional concerns that: 1) nonmarket economies are able to
disregard economic conditions and concentrate their resources on one product, so as to
flood U.S. markets much more quickly than a foreign market economy industry; 2) the
United States is unable to effectively apply existing unfair trade laws to NME imports; 3)
the United States will become dependent on communist countries for vital raw materials;
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prove that imports are "rapidly increasing," a difficult requirement
that does not exist under section 201.156
Although the statute has been in effect since 1974, relief has
never been granted in the history of section 406 and only ten cases
have been filed. Hence, the provision has been attacked as an inef-
fective mechanism for relief of U.S. industry.' 5 7 Proceedings under
the provision are "very unpredictable, extremely costly, and are
heavily influenced by political and international policy considera-
tions, which are prone to frequent and swift change."' 5 8 The Presi-
dent's broad discretion is generally believed to be the statute's major
problem. In all cases where the ITC has made an affirmative deter-
mination, the President has denied relief.' 59 Many commentators
have called for the modification of section 406160 to make it a useful,
rational approach to regulating NME imports.
Section 406 is also troubling to importers and NME exporters
because neither the statutory provisions of section 406 nor the ITC
determination under section 406 set forth any standards for compli-
ance with the law. 16 1 Professor Stanislaw Soltysinski of Adams Mick-
iewics University, Poznan, Poland, and NME exporters in general,
argue section 406 is discriminatory because it lumps all communist
countries together as "per se unfair" and applies a lower standard of
4) because communist nations are generally not signatories to bi- or multilateral agree-
ments, which require signatories to bind themselves to predetermined annual increases,
U.S. producers are unable to predict the level of imports from communist countries. It is
then more difficult for them to set their own levels of production. Id. at 118. But see
Speech by Robert Herzstein to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Roundtable Conference
on Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation (July 12, 1984) (asserting that it is unlikely
that nonmarket economies will mount a concerted effort to disrupt U.S. markets).
156 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(a) (1982); see also Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 827-28.
157 Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 827; see also Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5,
at 15 (statement of R. Cunningham); Speech by R. Gearhart to the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce Roundtable Conference on NME Import Regulation (July 21, 1984).
158 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 15 (statement, of Gary Horlick commenting
on the inadequacy of § 406); 125 CONG. REC. 15,706 (1979) (Senator Heinz discussing
the "excessive latitude given the President to overrule the ITC recommendations in § 406
cases") Id.; see, e.g., Anhydrous Ammonia from the U.S.S.R., 45 Fed. Reg. 27,570 (Int'l
Trade Comm. 1980) (report to President) stating:
The ammonia case is a vivid example of the capricious nature of deci-
sion-making under § 406, both at the International Trade Commission and
at the executive level. In October, the ITC determined that there was "mar-
ket disruption"; seven months later, it determined exactly the opposite.
Even more striking was the President's policy reversal. In December, he re-
jected import restrictions; one month later, he changed his mind to the point
of ordering an emergency quota to protect the U.S. industry.
Interface Two, supra note 32, at 372-73 (statement of R. Cunningham).
159 In addition to the Anhydrous Ammonia case, the President denied relief after affirma-
tive ITC determination in Clothespins from the PRC, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,547 (Int'l Trade
Comm. 1978) (Presidential memorandum), and Canned Mushrooms from the PRC, 47
Fed. Reg. 45,981 (Int'l Trade Comm. 1982) (determination).
160 See Stern Speech, supra note 19. Chairwoman Stern called for greater authority to
be provided the President in § 406 cases, for increased flexibility.
161 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 15 (statement of R. Cunningham).
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injury to their imports.1 62 Even if special rules are necessary for
NMEs in the unfair trade law area where cost valuation is not applica-
ble to government-controlled NME price structures, 16 3 Professor
Soltysinski argues that there is no reason to make such a distinction
in the injury area, where domestic injury is the sole criteria for relief
and cost disparities are not at issue.' 64
C. Antitrust Law
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination
Act,1 6 5 an antitrust statute, with the intention of preventing preda-
tory pricing practices.1 66 In addition to the unfair trade and discre-
tionary relief laws discussed previously, the mechanisms of the
Robinson-Patman Act may be invoked by private firms allegedly in-
jured by predatory pricing.' 6 7 Predatory pricing may include cut-
rate sales 168 or sales below costs intended to disable a competitor' 69
or take over a market.' 70 In contrast to the other previously dis-
cussed trade law, antitrust law imposes severe sanctions, such as in-
junctions, treble damages, and imprisonment for violators.171
As in the case of unfair trade laws,1 72 the difficulty of determin-
ing a fair NME import price or the valid cost of production in an
NME is substantial because NME costs and prices are distorted by
central planning. 173 Courts often lack the expertise of the ITC or
Commerce in analyzing complex product pricing and other eco-
nomic regulations based on surrogate or hypothetical calcula-
tions. 1 74  As a result, courts have refused to decide the
"reasonableness" of prices in NMEs and hence, will not apply anti-
trust law to NME imports. 17 5
Although AD law provides for the constructed value of such
prices when they cannot otherwise be validly obtained,' 76 the Robin-
162 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 184 (statement of Professor Stanislaw Soltysinski
of Adam Mickiewics University, Poznan, Poland).
163 See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
164 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 196 (statement of Professor Soltysinski).
165 Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, c. 323 § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b (1982)).
166 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685 (1967).
167 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 105 (statement of Louis B. Schwartz).
168 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 72 (1982).
169 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 105 (statement of Louis B. Schwartz).
170 Id.
171 id.
172 See supra notes 38-44.
173 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 106 (statement of Louis B. Schwartz).
174 Id. at 109.
175 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyson Pipe and Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
176 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
[VOL. 12
NME IMPORT REGULATION
son- Patman Act does not, 177 and courts have refused to construct
prices for NMEs in antitrust cases when NME home market sales can-
not be ascertained. 17 8 Because courts are not suited to calculate
complex price valuations, commentators have urged that antitrust
law is an "inappropriate and dangerous solution" to problems in-
volving low-priced imports. ' 7 9 It is especially dangerous because the
imposition of the draconian sanctions of the Act may disrupt trade
relations and instigate retaliation.
D. Impact of Present Law on NME Trade
Because section 406 and the antitrust laws have been almost
completely ineffective in regulating NME imports, and because
courts will no longer apply CVD law, the burden of regulating NME
imports falls almost exclusively on the AD law.180 As previously dis-
cussed, 8 1 this law is flawed; while it expressly recognizes that a
"fair" price cannot be determined in an NME,' 8 2 it proceeds to set
forth complex, hypothetical procedures to do just that. Despite dili-
gent efforts on its part, Commerce cannot be expected to do the im-
possible - to find a free-market price where there is no free market.
Rather than providing an accurate "fair" price, the application of
these procedures leads to an arbitrary, unpredictable and expensive
result that satisfies no one.
The potential impact of this flawed regulatory process should
not be underestimated. As noted above,' 8 3 the United States has a
favorable balance of trade with NME countries. This trade is signifi-
cant in volume and is generally predicted to increase in the future.
However, this promising trade picture can quite clearly be shat-
tered by the application of a burdensome and arbitrary AD law.
NMEs need to earn hard currency from their exports so that they
177 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 107.
178 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D.Del. 1978). The Delaware
District Court refused to construct a price for NME imports, holding that it would be a
"perversion of both the judicial function and the antitrust laws" to go beyond interpreta-
tion of existing law to create protectionist legislation for those who cannot compete with
lower prices. The court concluded that antitrust laws do not apply to unfairly priced NME
goods due to control of subsidation foreign governments. Id. at 400.
179 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 135 (statement of Louis B. Schwartz).
[T]he antitrust laws are ill-adapted to policing the fairness of cheap imports.
Rules relating to predatory pricing are virtually impossible to apply because
of the difficulty in determining costs in a centrally planned economy. Discov-
ery procedures are difficult to carry out fairly. The courts are not equipped
to engage in the continuing supervision, or to provide a nationally uniform
response as the basis for diplomatic negotiations and business planning.
Id. at 105.
180 Comment, U.S. Trade Laws Hinder the Development of U.S.-PRC Trade, 22 COLUM. J.
oF TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (1983).
181 See supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
182 That is why subsection c, the "state-controlled economy" provision of the AD law
was added to § 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982).
183 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
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may purchase imports from the United States.18 4 Further, NMEs
may retaliate against U.S. exports because of frustration with the AD
law's perceived unfair and exclusionary impact.
For example, the PRC is the United State's largest NME trading
partner, and is an important and growing market for U.S. manufac-
tured and agricultural products.' 8 5 The PRC has retaliated against
U.S. protectionist trade legislation in the past,' 86 and has expressed
frustration at present U.S. trade regulation laws. 187
Therefore, if the United States wants to insure the future expan-
sion of trade with NMEs, it must make changes in its regulation of
NME imports. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made it
clear that such changes must be made by Congress in the form of
new legislation.18 8 Any change in this law must achieve a crucial bal-
ance: on the one hand, it must protect U.S. industry, and on the
other hand, it must not disrupt the growing and beneficial U.S. trade
relationship with NMEs. 189
184 See S. CON. RES. 47, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 52-53 (1979); see also TRADE SUBCOMM.
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH CONG., IsT SESs., REPORT ON THE TRADE
MISSION TO THE FAR EAST 47-52 (Comm. Print 1985).
185 See STAFF OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT ON U.S. TRADE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN: 1983, 7-8 (Comm. Print
1983).
186 Id. The PRC drastically reduced agricultural imports from the United States, caus-
ing significant injury to the U.S. farm industry.
187 See Han Xu, U.S. Laws Threaten the Future of China-U.S. Trade, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 6, in which Mr. Han Xu, the Chinese ambassador to the United States
argues that China's access to the U.S. market is unfairly restricted because "the U.S.
dumping law as applied to China is contrary to what are generally considered the basic
characteristics of law - consistency, stability, predictability, and fairness." See also Han
Xu, Sino American Economic Cooperation, 3 CHINA L. REP. 160 (1986). This frustration is
exacerbated by the fact that the unilateral application of U.S. trading laws contradicts the
letter and spirit of the 1979 Trade Agreement between the United States and the PRC.
Agreement on Trade Relations,July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630 (published
by the American Society of International Law). This agreement requires both countries to
take all efforts to create "the most favorable conditions for strengthening in all aspects,
economic and trade relations between the two countries so as to promote continuous long
term development of trade between the two countries" and for the "mutual expansion of
their reciprocal trade." Id. Trade disputes are to be resolved first by consultation, and
only after consultations fail, by unilateral trade restraints. Id. at 1048-49. It is easy to see
how, after entering such an agreement in good faith, the PRC would be frustrated by
unilateral application of the arbitrary AD NME provisions.
188 Georgetown Steel, No. 85-2805, slip op., at 23.
189 Because they would fundamentally change existing law, the two proposals dis-
cussed infra, are considered to be, for the purposes of this Article, the major proposals for
reform of NME legislation. There have been other proposals, but these have been either
limited in scope or conceptually similar to current law or to the two proposals discussed
infra. One such proposal, however, put forth by the Committee for Fair Trade with China,
should be noted briefly. (See Hearings on Comprehensive Trade Legislation, before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (statement of
Edward Furia, Comm. for Fair Trade with China)). This proposal is essentially a combina-
tion of existing law and the artificial pricing proposal, but it containes a novel provision
that would create a separate category of NMEs, termed "planned market economies,"
comprised of countries that are found to be implementing economic reforms that would
enable them to operate on market principles (e.g., China and Hungary). The imports from
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III. Proposals for Change in Existing Law
After reviewing the almost universal criticism of the present
flawed regulatory system, it is not surprising that there are proposals
for the sweeping reform of this system. There are two major propos-
als for the reform of NME trade laws which will be considered in the
future. One, the artificial pricing proposal, 190 is price based, and the
other, the amended market disruption proposal,' 9' is injury based.
Before discussing these proposals, it should be noted that
neither is flawless. The proponents of both proposals concede that
there is no perfect solution to the NME import problem, in free-
market terms, because precise valuations cannot be made for NME
imports, and so it cannot be determined if they are actually "fair" or
"unfair." In recognition of this fact, neither proposal attempts to
force the application of the comparative advantage principles in this
context. Instead, both aim to add simplicity and predictability to a
process now overly complex and arbitrary.
A. Artificial Pricing Proposal
Senator John Heinz 192 has led the effort to reform the current
problematic system of regulating NME imports.' 93 He has done so
by proposing artificial pricing bills in each Congress since 1979.194
Generally, the artificial pricing legislation proposes to add a new
subtitle to the 1930 Tariff Act through the creation of a new artificial
pricing remedy for domestic industries competing with NME im-
ports.1 95 This legislation would create a distinct trade remedy law
countries in this category would be subject to a constructed value methodology; the
problems with this methodology are discussed supra, at notes 76-82 and accompanying
text. The imports of NMEs that are not in this new category would be regulated under an
artificial pricing standard; the problems with this standard are discussed infra, at notes
228-79 and accompanying text.
190 See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. There have been several variations
of the artificial pricing proposal; a result of differing minimum allowable import price stan-
dards. The fundamentals of these various versions are essentially the same and so, for the
purposes of this Article, they are considered together.
191 See infra notes 282-95 and accompanying text.
192 Second-term Senator from Pennsylvania, assisted by Chief Legislative Assistant
William Reinsch.
193 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. Senator Heinz stated: "In my view,
consideration of this issue is particularly necessary due to the growing complexity of our
trade relations with socialist countries. Increased trade has produced more unfair practice
cases involving nonmarket economies and consequently more dissatisfaction with present
law." 129 CONG. REC. S7356 (daily ed. May 24, 1983).
194 The most recent bill was S. 307, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S. 707 (daily
ed. Jan. 13, 1987) [hereinafter S. 307]. He has proposed other artificial pricing bills such
as S. 1868, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S. 16,002 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985)
[hereinafter S. 1868]; H.R. 3398, amend. 4267, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), 130 CONG.
REC. S11372 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984); S. 1351, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter
S. 1351]; S. 958, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter S. 958]; and S. 1966, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
195 See, e.g., S. 307, supra note 194; S. 1868, supra note 194.
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track for application to NMEs, separate from that used for market
economies. 196 Traditional AD law would no longer apply, and in-
stead, the artificial pricing proposal would create an entirely sepa-
rate, analogous group or track of provisions especially for
application to NME imports. Prior bills had proposed the replace-
ment of the CVD law, 197 and the repeal of section 406.198
The objective of the artificial pricing proposal is to create a sys-
tem with greater certainty, simplicity, and fairness in the regulation
of imports from NMEs' 99 by augmenting the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979,200 which has not been effective in remedying the trade
problems unique to NME imports. 20 1
The proposal seeks to change existing law through its three ma-
jor provisions: (a) the NME definition, (b) the two-track procedure,
and (c) the minimum allowable import price standard.
1. The NME Definition Provision
A major provision of the artificial pricing proposal involves the
definition of NMEs on an economic, rather than a political basis. 202
Under this provision, Commerce will determine whether the econ-
omy of a country "operates on market principles of cost or pricing
structures, ' 20 3 and may compile a list designating those countries
that do not operate in such a manner as NMEs.204 In making this
determination, the bill requires Commerce to consider: (1) the con-
vertibility of currency; (2) the extent wage rates are determined by
free bargaining; and (3) the allowability of joint ventures with for-
eign firms. 205
Senator Heinz asserts that this provision adds fairness and sim-
plicity to the bill. He argues that it recognizes and thus encourages
196 See, e.g., S. 1868, supra note 194.
197 S. 1351, supra note 194.
198 S. 958, supra note 194.
199 Senate Hearing on S. 958, supra note 35, at 25, in which Kopp stated:
[The bill] seeks to create a fairer and more certain means of determining
whether an unfair practice has occurred .... GAO studies and other evi-
dence presented to Congress in different contexts makes clear that uncer-
tainty is one of the major deterrents to trade. One of the biggest drawbacks
of present law is the uncertainty that the investigatory process creates for
both parties in a dispute.
Id.
200 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 151-93 (1979).
201 130 CONG. REC. S11378 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984); see also S. 307, supra note 194,
§ l(c)(1)(A).
202 See 133 CONG. REC. S. 708 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 1987); 131 CONG. REC. S 16002 (daily
ed. Nov. 20, 1985). The Trade Act of 1974 defines NMEs as those nations dominated by
Communism.
203 See S. 1868, supra note 194, § l(b)(18)(B).
204 The most recent artificial pricing proposal, S. 307, does not contain a listing re-
quirement, but previous proposals have consistently required such a listing. See, e.g., S.
1868, supra note 194, § I(b)(18)( F).
205 See S. 307, supra note 194, § l(b)(18)(B); S. 1868, supra note 194, § l(b)(18)(C).
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the progress of NMEs in adopting western economic models. 20 6 The
concept of annual listing of NMEs will also simplify the procedure,
he has asserted, because it avoids the necessity of making a determi-
nation on a case by case basis.20 7
This provision has several flaws. First, the factors considered by
Commerce are rigid and unrealistic, and it is apparent that no NME,
no matter how progressive, could satisfy them and be considered a
market economy.208 These factors consider only the economy as a
whole and do not consider progress in a particular sector. Further,
the maintenance of a list is itself rather inflexible 20 9 because the list
is legislatively fixed; thus, it will be difficult to remove a country de-
spite efforts by an NME to liberalize its economy. Some commenta-
tors express concern that the definition is vague and as a result gives
Commerce excessive discretion in defining an NME.2 10 The provi-
sion also has been criticized for its failure to include state-owned en-
terprises in market economies. 2 "
2. Two-Track Procedure
This "two-track" concept is the second major provision of the
artificial pricing proposal.21 2 It states that when an NME industry
provides verifiable and sufficient price information to Commerce,
then, in that particular investigation, AD law will apply to the NME
industry as it would to any market country's industry.21 3 The pur-
pose of this provision is to treat NME industries as much like free
market economies as possible.2 14 Senator Heinz argues that this
"carrot and stick" approach will encourage NMEs to cooperate with
Commerce and provide sufficient, reliable information demonstrat-
ing that the prices of a particular industry are market reflective;
206 131 CONG. REC. S1602 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985) (statement of Senator Heinz).
207 Id.; see also Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 34 (Allen Merken describing time
pressure under the previous legislation).
208 The requirements that currency be freely convertible and wage rates be freely ne-
gotiated between management and labor are clearly unrealistic for socialist countries for
the foreseeable future. No NME could satisfy them despite substantial efforts to liberalize
economic sectors. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text for more realistic
criteria.
209 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 833. Again, it should be noted that the
most recent version of the artificial pricing proposal, S. 307, dropped the listing require-
ment. See 133 CONG. REC. S. 707 (daily ed.Jan.13, 1987). However, the rigid effect of the
listing requirement is maintained under S. 307, because under § l(b)(18)(C), all determi-
nations by Commerce that a country is an NME will remain in effect until actually revoked
by Commerce; there will be no case by case analysis.
210 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 75 (statement of Richard Breault).
211 House Trade Hearings, supra note 19, at 1019 (discussion ofproblems of applying law
to state controlled enterprises in market economies). The Heinz bill defines a country as
an NME based on its economy as a whole.
212 See, e.g., S. 1868, supra note 194, § l(c)(1)(B).
213 131 CONG. REC. S1602 (daily ed., Nov. 20, 1985).
214 Id.
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otherwise, they will face the average import price standard. 215 This
cooperation in compiling realistic price figures will in turn help the
NME to move toward market principles, he asserts. 216
Domestic industry spokesmen oppose the two-track provision,
and cite three reasons why the provision should be removed from
the legislation. 2 17 First, they claim AD law is not appropriate for
NME imports218 because NMEs can never provide reliable price in-
formation. 219 U.S. industry deems the notion that an NME can
prove its prices are market-oriented as lacking merit in view of the
fact that NMEs: (1) have no decentralized pricing mechanisms; 220
(2) are members in long-term trade agreements within the eastern
block trade group, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), which removes the possibility for any member to become
significantly involved in trade with market economy countries;22 '
(3) distort consumer demand; 222 and (4) industrial investment is al-
most totally provided by the central government.223
Second, the U.S. steel industry urges that the determination of
what constitutes sufficient and verifiable information will give too
much discretion to Commerce. 224  Finally, domestic industry
projects that the provision will render the artificial pricing proceed-
ings overly complex, time consuming, and costly.22 5 Other critics
assert that the time limit for switching from an artificial pricing to an
AD investigation are insufficient. 226
In contrast, Senator Heinz asserts that the two-track concept
recognizes that some NME industries increasingly are becoming
market oriented, 227 citing the current economic policies in Hungary
and the People's Republic of China as examples.228 It is uncertain,
however, what exactly will be considered "sufficient" information,
and whether it will be realistically possible for an NME to meet that
requirement.
215 Id.
216 130 CONG. REC. S11378 (daily ed., Sept. 19, 1984); 133 CONG. REC. S16002 (daily
ed., Nov. 20, 1985).
217 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 56 (statement of Mangan, American Iron and
Steel Institute).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 73 (statement of the AFL-CIO).







226 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 836-37.
227 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Sen. Heinz).
228 Id. (Sen. Heinz notes China's policy of encouraging capitalism and free market
principles in its industries).
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3. Minimum Allowable Import Standard
The artificial pricing proposal's most controversial provision
would establish some type of a weighted average price benchmark,
below which no NME could sell, for each imported article. 229 This
standard has changed considerably through the legislation's history,
and presently there is no agreement on an appropriate standard.
In its early stages, the minimum allowable import standard was
the "lowest" average import price of a similar article from market
economy countries. 2 30 Despite administration support, this standard
was vehemently attacked by domestic industry advocates as being un-
fairly low,2 3 1 and as a result, was defeated on the Senate floor.232
Senator Heinz modified the standard, setting it at the average market
economy import price level, 23 3 a more difficult, and in his words, a
"more realistic and more appropriate standard. '2 3 4 However, this
standard has also been attacked for a variety of reasons, and as a
result, the legislation was dropped in conference from the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984.235 The most recent change in the standard sets it
229 See, e.g., S. 307, supra note 194, § l(c)(l); S. 1868, supra note 194; see also 131 CONG.
REC. S16002 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985). A duty would be imposed upon NME imports to
the extent this price standard exceeds the actual import price.
230 See S. 1351, supra note 194. It should be noted that this lowest average standard
was reproposed by Representative Bill Frenzel as part of H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987). Despite support from the administration, this provision was deleted from the bill
as a result of an amendment by Representative Richard Schulze, who was dissatisfied with
this standard and wanted a higher benchmark price. This bill would have amended the
current NME provision of antidumping law by applying a minimum import price bench-
mark that would be based on the "average import price of the eligible market economy
supplier whose average import price is lowest among the average import prices of all eligi-
ble market economy suppliers." Id. The provision qualified this lowest average standard
by providing Commerce with substantial discretion to choose a "next higher average"
price whenever it determined that the market economy supplier with the lowest average
import price was at a level of economic development which was significantly lower than the
NME under investigation. Notwithstanding its lower standard, this provision would have
been subject to the same problems of arbitrariness and unpredictability as the average
price standard. Moreover, this provision would have been more arbitrary than other artifi-
cial pricing proposals, because it would have broadened the standard for determining
comparable goods. It would have allowed Commerce to rely on a new standard, termed
"comparable merchandise," that would have been broader than the "such or similar" stan-
dard for comparison under present law. This provision would have increased the likeli-
hood, already substantial, that NME goods would be compared with non-similar market
economy goods, and that, hence, the "fair" import price of their goods would have been
based on the price of such dissimilar market goods.
231 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 49-64 (statement of American Iron and
Steel Institute, Domestic Nitrogen Producers and American Textile Manufacturers Insti-
tute). These commentators objected to the standard presumption that NMEs were as effi-
cient as the most efficient market producers. They asserted that this standard would
legitimize NME dumping as prices dropped to meet NME competition.
232 See Senate NIE Hearing, supra note 5, at 2.
233 See S. 1868, supra note 194, § l(c)(l).
234 See 129 CONG. REC. 7355 (daily ed. May 24, 1983).
235 This was mainly due to strong administration opposition to this standard. While
the administration supported the lowest average import price standard, it opposed the
average price standard.
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at the average U.S. import price of the largest volume market econ-
omy exporter of a like article. 236
Supporters of the minimum import price provisioi assert that it
is administrable and as fair as possible considering that actual prices
are unavailable. 23 7 They assert that the average import price stan-
dard is simple and administrable because it is based on shipping and
customs data already available,238 and is predictable because this
data is available to exporters, importers, and domestic industries. 23 9
Although supporters of the average price standard are uncom-
fortable with the standard's presumption that NME producers can-
not be more efficient than market producers, 240 they defend the
standard by asserting that the establishment of an average price
benchmark is the best possible method of regulating NME imports
because of the impossibility of determining costs and prices in an
NME. 24 1 Supporters point to the NME's recognized potential for
dumping due to government control and intervention as a rationale
for the average price concept.242
Further, the proposal's promoters assert that the principle of
comparative advantage is not applicable to NMEs because it is im-
possible to ascertain a realistic price for their goods.243 Some be-
lieve market economies are always more efficient producers and
competitors than NMEs 2 44 because market economy producers are
stimulated by profit motives and must be responsive to market
236 See S. 307, supra note 194, § l(c)(1).
237 131 CONG. REC. S. 7355 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985).
238 The COMPTROLLER GEN. 1981 REP., supra note 96, at 22 states:
The administrative advantage of this approach is that it eliminates the
need to analyze other market economies and their producers for suitability as
surrogates as well as the need to gain their cooperation. The administering
authority also is freed from the need to make what are often very subjective
adjustments to a surrogate producer's selling prices for differences in pro-
duction technology and scale.
In addition, this approach would give both nonmarket economy export-
ers and prospective U.S. petitioners a significantly clearer idea of what the
foreign market value of a given product is likely to be ....
Id. Further, the ease of administration resulting from this provision will reduce the litiga-
tion costs for both parties. Senate Hearing on S. 958, supra note 35, at 18 (statement of
Undersecretary Olmer); 131 CONG. REC. S1602 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1985).
239 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 6 (statement of Undersecretary Olmer). "We
believe the artificial pricing investigation proposed in [the Heinz legislation] would be
simpler and more predictable than current law, and therefore the best way to protect U.S.
industry against unfairly traded NME imports .... Domestic manufacturers could more
effectively anticipate the likelihood of relief, and weigh the costs and benefits of seeking
relief .... Importers would benefit from increased predictability by not buying imports
likely to be found unfairly traded .... NME producers could price more fairly in the first
place." Id.
240 Recent Developments, supra note 41, at 396.
241 Id. at 397.
242 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 14 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
243 Id. at 19 (statement of Gary Horlick).
244 Id. at 5 (statement of Undersecretary Olmer).
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forces, 24 5 while NME producers are insulated from the market place
and often operate without profit motives or domestic competitors to
keep them efficient. 24 6 Other supporters contend the assertion that
NMEs can have lower costs is meaningless in view of the fact that real
costs in an NME are unascertainable. 24 7 Finally, proponents assert
that the severity of the presumption of inefficiency is mitigated by the
bill's two-track provision which allows NMEs to be treated the same
as market economy countries if certain requirements are met.
Moreover, some commentators assert that it is a standard that is
generous to NMEs because they are generally less efficient. 248 Sup-
porters of the bill believe the standard will add certainty to the NME
import regulation process, which will in turn decrease the amount of
dumping from NMEs and the consequent disruption of trade with
NMEs.
2 4 9
However, the minimum import price benchmark has some major
flaws. First, it is arguably as arbitrary as the present regulatory ap-
proach. Commerce does not have a readily available price data base
from which to compare products from market countries to similar
products from NMEs. 2 50 Thus, Commerce may often find that the
only import statistics that are available are contained in the Tariff
Schedules of the United States (TSUS).2 5 1 However, TSUS classifica-
tions generally contain numerous items which vary greatly in type
and price and thus, to base the minimum allowable price of an NME
product on the average price of a TSUS category would be
arbitrary. 25 2
Moreover, there will always be variations in quality between sim-
ilar products which are legitimately reflected in price differentials. 2 53
Consequently, a minimum price standard based on the averaging of
245 Id.
246 Id.; see also House Trade Hearings, supra note 19, at 953 (John Heebner, president of a
domestic china producer, stating that despite the greater efficiency of U.S. producers, they
are undersold because Chinese producers are aided by a low standard of living and a Com-
munist government).
247 Id. at 17.
248 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 56, 64.
249 Id. at 22 (discussion of Sen. Heinz, Richard Cunningham and Gary Horlick, agree-
ing that the Heinz legislation would remedy the uncertainty and expense of present law
that discourages domestic industries from bringing antidumping cases).
250 See Comment, Artificial Pricing As An Alternative to Countervailing Duties Against Imports
From Nonmarket Economies, 8J. COMp. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 75, 83-84 (1986). The artifi-
cial pricing proposal does specify how Commerce will determine which products are com-
parable and from where Commerce will obtain the price data necessary to calculate the
minimum allowable import price standard.
251 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
252 For example, TSUS item 646.3040 includes six types of galvanized and non-galva-
nized nails. The prices of these nails can vary by up to 40%-50%. To base the "fair" price
of a particular NME nail import on the average price of nails in TSUS item 646.3040
would be arbitrary and unfair.
253 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 34 (statement of AAEI).
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import prices will contain a range of error that is often substantial. 254
Further, available import price data is often deceptive, because inac-
curate information may be provided by exporters, 255 and import
prices often reflect a number of factors unrelated to costs (such as
marketing and advertising). 256 Thus, the artificial pricing proposal's
minimum import standard will be unacceptably arbitrary and may
result in prohibitively high minimum price standards. 257
A second flaw in the standard is that it will be unpredictable.
NME exporters and U.S. importers can never be certain which prod-
ucts Commerce will determine to be sufficiently similar to use for
comparison with NME imports. 25 8 Further, even if NME exporters
knew this information, the price, volume, and exporters of a particu-
lar product can vary substantially from month to month, 259 making it
impossible to know the minimum import price in advance and thus
very difficult to take steps to comply. 260
A third flaw in the standard is that it will likely be very difficult to
administer. Commerce must somehow compile, verify, and adjust
price information, on a quarterly basis at minimum, for each and
every product that is imported into the United States from an NME.
This task appears to be extremely difficult and expensive, 26' and the
artificial pricing proposal does not explain how Commerce can be
expected to administer the standard.
A fourth problem with the standard results from the "special
rule for fungible products" provision contained in the most recent
artificial pricing proposal. 262 This provision states that for those
products deemed "fungible," foreign market value will be deter-
254 See id. at 34 (statement of Alan Merken).
255 See Verrill Speech, supra note 87, at 10.
256 Under an average import price standard, circumstances of sales adjustments, which
are vital to an accurate comparison, are not possible.
257 The arbitrary nature of this standard can be demonstrated through the hypotheti-
cal example of an importer of automobiles from an NME. If during the investigative pe-
riod, the largest market producer was BMW, the "fair" price of the NME imports would be
prohibitively high; if, however, the largest exporter was Volkswagon, the "fair" price
would be markedly lower. Even if the largest exporter were Volkswagon, the "average"
price would vary substantially depending on the quantity ofJettas imported relative to the
quantity of the lower-priced Golfs imported.
258 This will be especially true with very sophisticated or technical imports because
there are many features that can differentiate one product from another, and make them
non-comparable. See Comment, supra note 250, at 83-84.
259 The same is true for the largest market producer of a particular import under S.
307, which can vary from month to month as well, depending on the volume of a particu-
lar product that each market producer exports. Actual duties are not determined until one
year later, during the annual review, and hence, it is impossible to set prices at a "fair"
level when an exporter can do no more than guess at what the average price will be in the
future.
260 See Comment, supra note 250 n. 139. The artificial pricing proposals are silent on
this problem.
261 See Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 30 (statement of AAEI).
262 See S. 307, supra note 194, § I(c)(3).
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mined pursuant to what amounts to be a constructed value calcula-
tion. 26 3 This special test opens up a potentially enormous loophole
in the "artificial pricing" concept because a wide variety of products
can be considered "fungible," and thus subject to the problematic
constructed value test. 264 This result is especially ironic in light of
the fact that the artificial price concept would apply most effectively
to "fungible" products, which have few qualitative differences and
may thus be more easily compared and averaged. 265
Another flaw in the minimum price standard lies in its inherent
presumption that all NME produced imports are per se unfair if they
sell under the average import price of such goods. 266 NME critics
decry this presumption as discriminatory and arrogant 267 for a
number of reasons. First, NMEs are the most efficient producers of
certain products268 because of highly developed industrial sectors,
and therefore lower prices reflect cost advantages in labor, materials,
and production. 269 Second, some commentators believe that NMEs
do not purposely engage in predatory pricing,270 and that they often
attempt to obtain the highest possible price. 27' Third, some com-
mentators believe that the currencies of NMEs are overvalued 272 and
that the prices of imports will be cheaper if standard currency rates
are applied. 273 Finally, there are a number of other factors that ac-
count for the low prices of NME imports that have no relation to
unfair pricing. NMEs, as new market entrants, need to compensate
for the prejudice against goods produced in a communist country,
both by consumers 274 and the U.S. government:275 the nature of
their primary product imports often requires competitive pricing;276
263 Id. The provision calls for a determination of foreign market value from the "fac-
tors of production incurred in producing the merchandise." Id.
264 Hence, this provision will undermine the principle objective of the artificial pricing
proposal - to simplify NME import regulation through the application of an "average"
price - by subjecting a substantial amount of NME imports to the flawed constructed
value methodology. See supra notes 76-82.
265 This irony is especially disturbing in light of the fact that this provision was in-
cluded in the proposal for political reasons, and not out of concern for a more workable
NME statute.
266 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 186 (Prof. Soltysinski).
267 Id. at 186.
268 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 465.
269 Id.
270 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 30 (statement of the AAEI); see also Interface
Two, supra note 32, at 34 (statement of Alan Merken, Action Tungsram, Inc., supporting
the same assertion).
271 Senate NME Hearing, supra note 5, at 34 (statement of Merken).
272 Interface Two, supra note 32, at 465.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 181 (Prof. Soltysinski).
275 House Trade Hearings, supra note 19, at 914 (Prof. Marer). Discrimination is said to
be explicit and implicit, in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
276 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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and their low prices reflect differences in quality277 or lack of experi-
ence in marketing their goods through methods such as advertising,
service, warranties, and brand names. 278
Thus, to require NME imports to sell at or above the average
import price, which is generally the price of established market lead-
ers, would be unfair, and could very well preclude them from the
U.S. market altogether. 279
Supporters of the average price standard point out that Com-
merce has successfully applied an average import standard in recent
cases. 280 However, Commerce itself recognizes the problems en-
countered with this standard, and uses it only as a last possible ap-
proach when no other information is available. Further, in these
cases, Commerce has had difficulty finding a comparable import cat-
egory from which to take prices.
As a result of its many flaws,281 the minimum import price stan-
dard is an unacceptable basis for regulatory NME imports, and as
long as the artificial pricing proposal contains such a standard, it is
fundamentally flawed. The impact of this standard should not be un-
derestimated. The arbitrary nature of the price standard may result
in a prohibitively high minimum allowable price. This standard
forces NMEs to price at average market rates which are generally the
rates of well-established market leaders. NMEs are generally new
market entrants, who must prove that they are reliable suppliers and
who cannot realistically price at such levels. Therefore, the standard
may have a severely restrictive effect on NME imports and as a result,
may jeopardize the overall U.S.-NME trade relationship.
While the minimum import price provision has laudable objec-
tives, it fails because, like the present law, it attempts to determine a
"fair" NME import price when such a price is impossible to
determine.
277 Interface One, supra note 29, at 254.
278 House Trade Hearings, supra note 19, at 914 (Prof. Marer).
279 See Han Xu supra note 187, at 6, in which Mr. Han Xu states that:
[U]nfortunately a number of U.S. trade laws and legislation now being con-
sidered by the U.S. Congress threaten to restrict China's exports to the U.S.,
and thus jeopardize the prospects for growth and bilateral trade. . . . We
are particularly opposed to using the U.S. average import price as a bench-
mark because it would severely erode China's competitive advantages in la-
bor and raw materials.
280 See Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware, 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,419; Certain Iron Construc-
tion Castings from the People's Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 9483 (Dep't of Comm.
1986)(final determination).
281 Another flaw of the minimum allowable import price standard becomes apparent
when there are no "eligible" market economy producers. In such a case, foreign market
value would be determined by the flawed constructed value approach of current law. See S.
307, supra note 194, § 1(c)(2). The use of the constructed value approach was not an
uncommon event; for example, this approach would be applied when all market exporters
are either under investigation, or are under a dumping order.
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B. Amended Market Disruption Proposal
1. Overview
Like the advocates of the artificial pricing proposal, the propo-
nents of an amended market disruption proposal view the existing
unfair trade laws, 2 82 particularly the surrogate country/constructed
value approach of AD law, as tremendously confusing, unfair, expen-
sive and arbitrary for importers, NME exporters, domestic industry
and government administrators. 283 However, the amended market
disruption proposal (the section 406 proposal) would go further
than the artificial pricing proposal in redrafting and amending the
existing regulatory system.
The advocates of the section 406 proposal assert that there is no
equitable and predictable way for measuring the fair market value of
NME imports or of valuing the cost of production in NMEs. 284
Hence, its proponents argue that any import regulation laws attempt-
ing to legislate a price-based mechanism for measuring fair market
value, including artificial pricing legislation, with its minimum allow-
able import price standard,28 5 will fail when applied to NMEs.2 86 Be-
cause the artificial pricing proposal will impose a price-based
standard on imports from countries where prices cannot be deter-
mined, the advocates argue that it will be subject to many of the eco-
nomic flaws of present law, which is also price-based.
Specifically, they assert that the artificial pricing proposal's aver-
age price standard will be arbitrary and unpredictable because of the
problems encountered in obtaining accurate price data for "compa-
rable" imports.28 7 Further, they argue that the standard's assump-
tion that NMEs are unable to produce efficiently at internationally
competitive prices is unfair, discriminatory, and potentially disrup-
tive;28 8 the average price standard will likely be prohibitively high
and will preclude many industrial sectors of NMEs' economies,
which are labor intensive and depend on lower prices to compete,
from trading with the United States. Finally, the proponents con-
tend that this prohibitive effect could lead to retaliation against U.S.
exports, particularly agricultural exports. 289
Because there cannot possibly be an effective price-based NME
282 See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
283 See Trade Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
on Ways &Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986) (statement of Frank L. Morsani, Chairman
of the Board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter Trade Reform Hearings].
284 Id.
285 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, East-West Task Force, Statement on Revising U.S.
Import Laws Regulating NME Imports (Mar. 1986) (unpublished document).
286 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, East-West Trade Policy Newsletter (Mar. 1986)
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trade provision, advocates of the section 406 proposal have called
for a provision that is entirely injury-based; an injury determination
would be the sole requirement for import relief under this propo-
sal. 290 The proposal eliminates the futile, theoretical, troublesome,
costly, and arbitrary struggle to find a "fair" price. The policy behind
this novel approach is that if the NME import is not having an injuri-
ous effect in the United States, then the price charged is irrelevant.
If, on the other hand, the imports have an injurious effect on U.S.
industry, and if the actual prices cannot be determined, then action
must be taken based on the effect, not the price.29i
While the idea for such a section 406 approach has circulated
through the trade community for a number of years, no legislative
proposal has been initiated to replace the various laws governing
NME imports with an amended section 406 provision. 292 As a result,
this Article sets forth a legislative proposal for an amended market
disruption statute that would replace the present system of regulat-
ing NME imports in its entirety. 2 93 The proposal is attached to this
Article as an appendix, and will be discussed below. 29 4
This proposal 295 is essentially a substantial amendment of sec-
tion 406.296 Section 406 provides a basic procedure for relief to do-
mestic industries that have been injured by imports from communist
countries. This procedure has been ineffective, however, principally
due to two problematic provisions: the requirement that imports are
"rapidly" increasing, and the President's broad discretionary author-
ity to accept or reject the ITC relief recommendations. 297 This pro-
posal would amend and augment section 406 with several provisions
in order to make it an effective and rational relief mechanism; one
that is the best possible alternative to present law. The proposal ba-
sically allows any domestic entity (industry, manufacturer, or labor
290 See Trade Reform Hearings, supra note 283.
291 See Atlantic Council on East-West Trade, East-West Trade Managing Encounter
and Accommodation 112 (1977) (unpublished document); Legal Times, Oct. 20, 1986, p.
19.
292 There was a proposal for the amendment of § 406 that was put forth in the 99th
Congress by Congressman Schulz of Pennsylvania. It was proposed as § 124 of H.R. 4800
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). However, this bill did not seek to change the existing system
of NME trade regulation. Instead, it sought to make it easier for a domestic industry to
bring a § 406 complaint, mainly by lowering the injury standard and by reducing presiden-
tial discretion. The bill seeks to limit such discretion by transferring the President's au-
thority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In reality, this will do little to curtail executive
discretion.
293 The proposed revision of § 406 represents the personal views of the author. How-
ever, in composing the proposal, the author has attempted to reflect the general concepts
put forward by advocates of an amended § 406, particularly the concepts of the East-West
Task Force of the International Division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which is di-
rected by Donald Hasfurther.
294 See generally Appendix.
295 Id.




union) to file a petition for import relief with the ITC. The ITC
would then make an investigation to determine if market disruption
exists. If it finds in the affirmative, then it may use a variety of reme-
dial measures to relieve the injured domestic industry. The ITC
would have the discretion to choose the least disruptive measure.
Any actions taken by the ITC would be subject to dramatically re-
duced presidential discretion, and would be subject to an immediate
review, as well as an annual review. The major provisions of the sec-
tion 406 proposal are discussed below.
2. NME Definition
The first major amendment to section 406 would make it "no-
nideological" by defining NMEs on an economic rather than a polit-
ical basis. 29 8 Similar to the "two-track" provision of the artificial
pricing proposal, 29 9 this provision would allow an NME industry to
supply information that its prices will reflect market forces, and thus
subject it to investigation under normal AD or CVD law. 30 0 Second,
like the artificial pricing proposal,3 0 ' there would be a specific set of
definitional guidelines for Commerce to follow in determining what
countries are to be considered NMEs. 30 2 Unlike the artificial policy
proposal, however, the section 406 proposal's guidelines would be
less rigid and more pragmatic: (1) the provision will not require
NME countries to be listed,30 3 which would allow the ITC to be flexi-
ble in dealing with NMEs on a case by case basis; and (2) the guide-
lines themselves would include such factors as uniformity of
exchange rates (not convertibility) and permissibility of repatriation
of foreign investment returns, which would realistically apply to
countries such as Hungary and China that are adopting market-ori-
ented policies. 30 4
298 See Appendix § 406(h)(1).
299 See supra notes 203-18 and accompanying text.
300 See Appendix § 406(h)(1)(i). Under the proposal, an NME is defined on a sectoral
basis and not in terms of the entire economy. This provides NMEs with a more feasible
opportunity to be treated like other countries, and will therefore serve as an incentive to
them to transform important industries to operate on market principles. Unlike the artifi-
cial pricing approach, there need not be a complex "switch" by a country "listed" as an
NME. Instead, at the outset of each investigation, a determination will be made, based on
the industrial sector of a country, as to whether such country should be defined as an
NME.
301 See supra notes 20 1-10 and accompanying text.
302 See Appendix § 406(h)(1).
303 See supra note 203 and accompnaying text; supra note 208 and accompanying text.
304 See Appendix § 406(h)(l)(ii)-(iv). These factors are more realistic with respect to
progressive NMEs because there is a strong possibility that, with further economic re-
forms, they may be satisfied. The factors set forth in the artificial pricing legislation are
meaningless because no NME will be able to sufficiently satisfy them all.
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3. Injury Standard
The proposal would amend section 406 by establishing an injury
standard (a significant cause of material injury)305 that is higher than
AD law (a "cause of material injury") 30 6 but lower than section 201
(a "substantial cause of serious injury"). 30 7 Further, the provision
amends section 406 by removing the stringent requirement that
NME imports be "increasing rapidly. 308
The standard was set at this level as a compromise in light of the
fact that it is impossible to determine whether an NME is trading
unfairly. The proposal's standard is set above the unfair trade injury
standard (AD and CVD) because that low standard assumes NME
imports are selling at an unfair price (which is unknown in the case of
an NME), and hence does not require the domestic industry to make
much of a showing of injury. 309 The proposal's standard is set lower
than the escape clause injury standard because that high standard
assumes the import is selling fairly and thus requires domestic indus-
try to make a very compelling showing of substantial injury.310 The
section 406 standard is set at a point where there is neither an as-
sumption that the NME is trading unfairly nor that it is trading fairly,
and where domestic industry is protected without unreasonably or
unnecessarily imposing arbitrary, price-based relief measures on
NMEs. 311
The fact that NME imports would no longer be subject to price-
based law does not mean that NMEs will be treated more leniently
than other market economy countries. First, the only reason price-
based laws would not be applied to NMEs is that, as demonstrated
throughout this Article, realistically they cannot be. This proposal
recognizes this fact. Second, NMEs are actually treated more harshly
than other countries under this provision because section h(2) would
apply a lower injury standard to NME imports, despite the fact such
imports have not been demonstrated to be unfair.
305 See Appendix § 406(h)(2), (3), (4).
306 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
308 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 39, at 838; supra note 156 and accompanying
text.
309 Under the Unfair Trade Laws, NME imports need only be "a" cause of material
injury.
310 Under the escape clause, NME imports must be a substantial cause of serious injury.
19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(1) (1982).
311 The amended proposal of § 406(h)(2) will protect domestic industry because the
standard is not difficult to satisfy. "A significant cause of material injury" will be inter-
preted by the ITC to require only a moderate showing of injury before remedial measures
are taken under § 406(b). However, when the domestic industry is not injured, NMEs will




The amended section 406 proposal would invest the ITC with
the power to take a broad variety of measures to relieve domestic
industry upon a finding of market disruption. 312 The ITC may im-
pose a duty or a quota, or may call for a negotiated agreement. 3t 3 As
is the case under present law, the section 406 proposal allows the
ITC to impose a duty on NME imports, including a duty based on a
comparison of the NME import price with the lowest average market
economy import price.314
However, unlike the present law or the artificial pricing propo-
sal, the amended section 406 approach generally does not require
that a duty be imposed in each case where an affirmative determina-
tion is made.3 15 In circumstances where other, more administrable
and less disruptive measures can provide relief to domestic industry,
the ITC need not impose duties. 316 For instance, the ITC can direct
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate a long
term quantitative restraint agreement that would remedy domestic
industry, but at the same time would foster consistent, stable trade
relations.317
Finally, it should be noted that the time period under the
amended section 406 proposal would also be shorter than either AD
or CVD law. This procedural fact will benefit U.S. industry because
it will allow them to obtain relief much more swiftly.3 1 8
5. Presidential Discretion
A very important provision of the amended section 406 proposal
would drastically reduce the discretion afforded the President under
312 See Appendix § 406(b)(2).
313 Id.
314 The ITC may impose the relief provided for in the artificial pricing proposal under
§ 406(b)(2)(a) of the Appendix. The ITC may, if it deems appropriate, impose a duty
based on a comparison of the NME sales price with the average import price of a compara-
ble article from the market producer which is the largest exporter of the article.
315 Both present law and the artificial pricing proposal require that, upon a final deter-
mination of dumping, see 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982), or artificial pricing, see S.1868, supra
note 194, § l(c)(l), a duty must be imposed. Under the artificial pricing proposal, the
duty is effectively the difference between the "actual" price, and the average market econ-
omy price.
316 Where the imposition of a duty would be disruptive of trade with NMEs or difficult
to administer, the ITC is not forced to impose the duty. For instance, if the ITC has
difficulty in obtaining price data with regard to a comparable product, then it need not
struggle with such comparisons if it can find another effective remedy. No such flexibility
exists under the artificial pricing proposal.
317 Long-term trade agreements are consistent with the way NMEs often conduct
trade. They provide the NME with a consistent, predictable trade structure with which
they can comply.
318 See Trade Policy Newsletter, supra note 286. The process will be much faster be-
cause there will no longer be a need for complex, hypothetical price calculations and
product comparisons.
1987]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the original section 406.319 Under this proposal, only in a national
emergency, narrowly construed, would the President have the au-
thority to interfere with an ITC determination or action under the
proposal. 320
Further, as a procedural matter, the President's veto power has
been restructured. Unlike the original section 406, under which the
President must act before the relief order will take effect, the ITC
relief order automatically would go into effect unless the President
acts.3 21 This further reduces presidential discretion.322
6. Review
There are two provisions for review under the amended section
406 proposal. The first grants a right of immediate review to anyone
adversely affected by the ITC final determination or relief action
taken pursuant thereto. 323 The appeal would be to the U.S. Court of
International Trade, and the ruling of that court would be
mandatory. 324 This provision would allow a petitioner who received
insufficient relief to immediately appeal the ITC action to the CIT
and would protect domestic industry from any potential unenthusias-
tic enforcement by the ITC.
The second review provision of the amended section 406 propo-
sal requires the ITC to conduct an annual review of its market dis-
ruption determination. 325 The ITC is directed to determine whether
market disruption still exists, and if so, whether the actions taken by
the ITC have sufficiently relieved the injured domestic industry.326
This provides further protection to domestic industry because it in-
sures that the relief measures taken by the ITC would be closely
monitored to insure that the market disruption is eliminated.
After a review of the amended section 406 proposal, it is clear
that it is the most preferable alternative to existing law. The ad-
ministering agency benefits because the proposal is much more ad-
319 See Appendix § 406(e).
320 See Appendix § 406(e)(4). The ITC action must have a "serious negative" impact
on national security.
321 Thus, if the President does nothing, the ITC relief action will still be implemented
under Appendix § 406(e)(2). This procedure is modeled on the presidential veto structure
of § 337 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
322 See Palmeter, Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisition Rides Again, 20 IN'L L.
641, 651 (1986), for a discussion of the effects of the implementation of the § 337 presi-
dential veto model.
323 See Appendix § 406(f).
324 The standard of review would be the abuse of discretion standard, the same as
exists under the present law.
325 See Appendix § 406(g)(2). This provision is similar to the annual review provision
of the current unfair trade laws found at 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982), but with specific refer-
ence to NMEs.




ministrable than current law,3 2 7 and because it is granted flexibility
in fashioning relief. Domestic industry will benefit because upon a
moderate demonstration of injury, they will quickly receive complete
relief-relief that is not contingent on a determination of "unfair"
value.3 28 Further, domestic industry will have a right to both an im-
mediate and an annual review of the ITC relief action. NMEs will
benefit in three important ways: they will have a realistic opportunity
to demonstrate that a particular industrial sector is market-oriented;
the remedial measures imposed upon them will be less disruptive of
trade; and such measures will be reviewed annually. A final benefit
to the administering agency, the domestic industry, and the NMEs is
that the proposal will create a less litigious, and consequently less
costly, process.3 29
IV. Conclusion
There is a strong consensus that the present laws regulating im-
ports from NMEs have fundamental economic and legal flaws. Not
only do they create unwarranted delay, confusion, expense, and
waste of resources, but more importantly, they disrupt trade between
the United States and the NMEs. 330 As a result, swift and wide-rang-
ing reform of these laws is essential.
This Article discusses the two major proposals for the reform of
current NME trade laws. The adoption of either proposal would be
preferable to the status quo. Both recognize the reality that actual
prices and costs of NMEs cannot be valued in free market terms,
both allow an NME industry to provide information that will allow it
to be treated under conventional AD or CVD law in a particular in-
vestigation, and both define NMEs in economic rather than political
terms.
In the final analysis, however, the section 406 proposal is sub-
stantially better than the artificial pricing proposal. The artificial
pricing proposal suffers from a number of flaws that speak out
against its adoption. This proposal still struggles to find a price-
based solution, even though prices cannot be determined. The two-
track and NME definition provisions contain unrealistic require-
327 There will no longer be a dual agency approach that wastes tremendous resources
struggling to determine a "fair" market price in an NME. Rather, one agency will deter-
mine whether a U.S. industry is injured, which is a determination that is easy to quantify
from readily available data.
328 Under existing law, an injured domestic industry will not receive relief if Com-
merce determines, based on a complex, hypothetical, and arbitrary calculation of home
market value, that the NME imports are not selling at an unfair price.
329 The process will be temporarily shorter, and will involve only one agency (the
ITC) and one issue (injury). The complex and litigious price calculations will be
eliminated.
330 See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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ments that render those provisions almost useless.33' Finally, the
minimum allowable import price standard is problematic in a
number of respects: it is discriminatory; it requires difficult if not
impossible comparisons; and it is subject to a substantial range of
error. These problems render the standard arbitrarily unpredict-
able, unadministrable, unfair, and most importantly, potentially dis-
ruptive of trade with NMEs.3 3 2
Thus, while the artificial pricing proposal has laudable goals, it
is much less appealing than the legally and economically pragmatic
section 406 proposal. The section 406 proposal recognizes the futil-
ity of applying cost-based law to NMEs and instead applies a simple,
effective, and administrable injury-based law.
The section 406 proposal has a realistic NME definition provi-
sion that would allow the ITC flexibility in dealing with various in-
dustrial sectors of NMEs, and would encourage NMEs to move
toward market principals.333 It would be simpler, fairer, more ad-
ministrable, and less litigious, because remedial actions are taken
based on demonstrated injury to a U.S. industry.33 4 Finally, the pro-
posal would effectively satisfy the difficult trade dilemma encoun-
tered when striving to regulate NME imports: on the one hand, it
would protect domestic industry from injury, while on the other
hand, it would not disrupt trade relations with NMEs.33 5 Indeed, the
ITC's flexibility in applying the least disruptive measure would en-
hance the U.S.-NME trade relationships because it would add stabil-
ity and consistency to the regulatory process.
Therefore, the section 406 proposal is economically and legally
the realistic, feasible, and necessary choice in replacing a troubled
and ineffective system of import regulation. It is also politically ac-
ceptable, and hence, Congress should act to implement the proposal
in the upcoming trade bill. Adoption of the proposal would help
trade with NMEs to increase to its full potential, and would benefit
both the United States and NMEs.a3 6 A final point that is perhaps
the most significant of all is that through increased trade and eco-
nomic interdependence, the section 406 proposal may foster closer
political and social relations between NMEs and the United States.
331 See supra notes 201-27 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text; supra notes 171-94 and accompany-
ing text. The standard may disrupt trade with NMEs because it will likely set arbitrarily
high price benchmarks that will preclude NMEs from exporting from a variety of industrial
sectors. This will reduce the "hard" currency with which NMEs can purchase U.S. exports,
and will invite retaliation against U.S. manufactured and agricultural exports.
33 See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
335 See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.






Section 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677(b)) is
amended-
(1) by striking subsection (c);
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2436) is
amended-
(1) by striking out "Communist country" each place it appears
therein and inserting "non-market economy country";
(2) by striking paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a).
(3) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
Determination
"(b)(1) The Commission shall make its determination under
this section at the earliest practicable time, but no
later than 3 months after the date on which the peti-
tion is filed (or the date on which the request or reso-
lution is received or the motion is adopted as the case
may be). The Commission shall make public such de-
termination and shall cause a summary thereof to be
published in the Federal Register.
"(b)(2) If the Commission determines that market disruption
exists with respect to an article produced by a domes-
tic industry, it shall, to the extent it determines neces-
sary to prevent or remedy such market disruption:
"(a) Direct an increase in or imposition of any duty on
the article causing or threatening to cause market
disruption, including a variable duty based on a
comparison of the non-market economy import
price of a comparable article from the market pro-
ducer which is the largest exporter of the product to
the United States.
"(b) Direct the imposition of a tariff-rate quota on such
article;
"(c) Direct a modification of, or imposition of, any quan-
titative restriction on the import into the United
States of such article;
"(d) Direct the United States Trade Representative to
negotiate, conclude and carry out, within 60 days of
its determination, orderly marketing agreements
with foreign countries and the import into the
United States of such articles within 60 days of its
determination; or
"(e) Take any combination of such actions.
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"(b)(3) The Commission shall include in its determination any
directives issued under subsection (2), and shall notify
the Secretary of the Treasury of any action under par-
agraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (2)."
(4) by amending subsection (e) to read as follows:
Referral to President
"(e)(1) If the Commission determines that market dis-
ruption exists under this section, it shall promptly
transmit to the President a copy of such determi-
nation, together with the entire record upon
which such determination is based.
"(e)(2) If the President does not disapprove such deter-
mination within 60 days of the day he receives a
copy of such determination or if he notifies the
Commission before the close of such period that
he approves such determination, then such deter-
mination shall be effective as of the date of publi-
cation thereof in the Federal Register, and shall
become final on the day after the close of such
period or the day on which the President notifies
the Commission of his approval, as the case may
be.
"(e)(3) If before the close of such 60 day period the Pres-
ident disapproves such determination and noti-
fies the Commission of his disapproval, then
effective on the date of such notice, such determi-
nation and the action taken under subsection
(b)(2) of this section with respect thereto shall
have no force or effect.
"(e)(4) The President may disapprove such a determina-
tion only if such determination and action taken
under subsection (b)(2) of this section with re-
spect thereto would have a serious negative im-
pact on the national security of the United
States."
(5) by adding at the end thereof, the following new
subsection:
Review
"(f) Any person adversely affected by a final determi-
nation and actions taken under subsection (b)(2)
of this section with respect thereto of the Com-
mission, including a petitioner under subsection
(a) of this section who has not received sufficient
relief from actions taken under subsection (b) of
this section, may appeal such determination to the
United States Court of International Trade, which
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shall have jurisdiction to review such
determination."
Duration
"(g)(1) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this sec-
tion, any action taken under subsection (b) of this
section shall continue in effect until the Commis-
sion finds that the conditions which led to deter-
mination of market disruption under subsection
(b) no longer exist.
"(g)(2) At least once during each 12 month period be-
ginning on the anniversary of the date of Publica-
tion of an action taken under subsection (b) of
this Section, the Commission shall:
"(i) Determine whether the conditions which led
to a determination of market disruption
under subsection (b) still exist, and if so,
whether the action taken under Sub-section
(b) of this section was sufficient to completely
eliminate market disruption.
"(ii) Review the current status of, and compliance
with any agreement entered under subsection
(b)(2)(a).
Definition
"(h)(1) For purposes of this section, the term 'non-mar-
ket economy country' means any foreign country
that is designated as a non-market economy
country by the United States Trade Representa-
tive. In making such a designation, United States
Trade Representative shall consider the follow-
ing factors:
"(i) The extent to which the industrial sector of
the economy of the foreign country operates
on market principles of cost or pricing struc-
tures, so that the sales of merchandise of such
countries reflect the fair value of the mer-
chandise; and
"(ii) the extent to which the currency of the for-
eign country is uniform with the currency of
other countries; and
"(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other in-
vestments by firms of other foreign countries
are permitted in the foreign country; and
"(iv) the extent to which repatriation of foreign in-
vestment returns is permitted; and
"(v) such other factors as the United States Trade
Representative considers appropriate."
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"(h)(2) For purposes of this section, market disruption
exists within a domestic industry whenever an ar-
ticle is being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities (either absolutely or
relatively) as to be a significant cause of material
injury or a threat thereof, to the domestic indus-
try providing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article.
"(h)(3) In making its determination under paragraph (2),




"(i) the volume of imports of the merchandise
which is the subject of the investigation;
"(ii) the effect of imports of the merchandise on
prices in the United States for like or directly
competitive articles;
"(iii) the impact of imports of such merchandise on
domestic producers of like or directly com-
petitive articles;
"(iv) evidence of disruptive pricing practices, or
other efforts to unfairly manage trade pat-
terns; and
"(v) the extent to which the import price is below
the average import price of a comparable
product from the market producer which is
the largest exporter of the product to the
United States."
(4) For purposes of paragraph (3) -
"(a) In evaluating the volume of imports of merchan-
dise, the Commission shall consider whether the
increase in the volume of imports of the mer-
chandise, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the United
States, is significant.
"(b) In evaluating the effect of imports of such mer-
chandise on prices, the Commission shall con-
sider whether:
"(i) there has been significant price undercutting
by the imported merchandise as compared
with the average import price of a comparable
product from the market producer which is
the largest exporter of the product to the
United States, and
"(ii) the effect of imports of such merchandise
otherwise depresses prices to a significant de-
gree or prevents price increases, which other-
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wise would have occurred, to a significant
degree.
"(c) In examining the impact of the affected indus-
try, the Commission shall evaluate all relevant
economic factors which have a bearing on the
state of the industry, including, but not limited
to -
"(i) actual and potential decline in output sales,
market share, profits, productivity, return on
investments, and utilization of capacity,
"(ii) factors affecting domestic prices, and
"(iii) actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employment wages, growth,
ability to raise capital, and investment. ' 337
337 See supra notes 2-4.
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